This paper examines the effect of the degree of aggregate risk on social value of information in a production economy with a stock market. If the risk is firm-specific and there is no aggregate risk, public information will be socially harmful rather than valuable when there are no new markets for signal-contingent trades. We show that this result can be extended to the economy under small aggregate risk. In this case, the welfare gain from the increase in production effieciency due to public information is dominated by the welfare loss from the reduced risk-sharing opportunities. Also, these results can be extended to the case of private information due to the property of the generically fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium. [...
This paper addresses the question of how public announcements can affect social welfare in an exper...
The value of information is examined in a risk-sharing environment with unawareness and complete mar...
This paper has two goals. First, we demonstrate that standard arguments and methods from production ...
Szczutkowski A. The Social Value of Income Information in a Model with Market Power and Endogenous V...
In this paper, we revisit the conventional view on efficient risk sharing that advance information o...
According to the conventional view on efficient risk sharing (Hirshleifer, 1971), better information...
Suppose that agents share risks in competitive markets. We show that better information makes everyo...
Eckwert B, Zilcha I. The Value of Information in Production Economies. Journal of Economic Theory. 2...
We study the value of public information in a stochastic exchange economy where agents trade assets ...
The paper generalizes Blackwell's Theorem, according to which the welfare effects of an improvement ...
I study the welfare effects of a lack of common knowledge in a dynamic price-setting model with inco...
We study the value of public information in competitive economies with incomplete markets. We show t...
We study the value of information in a competitive economy in which agents trade in asset markets to...
In a general equilibrium economy with uninsurable aggregate liquidity shocks, we show that public in...
We examine the welfare effects of costly information acquistion in a version of the Grossman-Stiglit...
This paper addresses the question of how public announcements can affect social welfare in an exper...
The value of information is examined in a risk-sharing environment with unawareness and complete mar...
This paper has two goals. First, we demonstrate that standard arguments and methods from production ...
Szczutkowski A. The Social Value of Income Information in a Model with Market Power and Endogenous V...
In this paper, we revisit the conventional view on efficient risk sharing that advance information o...
According to the conventional view on efficient risk sharing (Hirshleifer, 1971), better information...
Suppose that agents share risks in competitive markets. We show that better information makes everyo...
Eckwert B, Zilcha I. The Value of Information in Production Economies. Journal of Economic Theory. 2...
We study the value of public information in a stochastic exchange economy where agents trade assets ...
The paper generalizes Blackwell's Theorem, according to which the welfare effects of an improvement ...
I study the welfare effects of a lack of common knowledge in a dynamic price-setting model with inco...
We study the value of public information in competitive economies with incomplete markets. We show t...
We study the value of information in a competitive economy in which agents trade in asset markets to...
In a general equilibrium economy with uninsurable aggregate liquidity shocks, we show that public in...
We examine the welfare effects of costly information acquistion in a version of the Grossman-Stiglit...
This paper addresses the question of how public announcements can affect social welfare in an exper...
The value of information is examined in a risk-sharing environment with unawareness and complete mar...
This paper has two goals. First, we demonstrate that standard arguments and methods from production ...