This paper presents a unified framework to study the co-evolution of networks and play, using the language of evolutionary game theory. We show by examples that the set-up is rich enough to encompass many recent models discussed by the literature. We completely characterize the invariant distribution of such processes and show how to calculate stochastically stable states by means of a treecharacterization algorithm. Moreover, specializing the process a bit further allows us to completely characterize the generated random graph ensemble. This new result demonstrates a new and rather general relation between random graph theory and evolutionary models with endogenous interaction structures.
In this paper we develop a dynamical theory of coevolution in ecological communities. The derivation...
Population learning in dynamic economies has been traditionally studied in over-simplified settings ...
Cooperative behavior that increases the fitness of others at a cost to oneself can be promoted by na...
Staudigl M. Co-evolutionary dynamics and Bayesian interaction games. International Journal of Game T...
In a Bayesian interaction game players have diverse preferences and are randomly matched according t...
This paper studies the co-evolution of networks and play in the context of finite population potenti...
Population structure can have a significant effect on evolution. For some systems with sufficient sy...
We extend the notion of Evolutionarily Stable Strategies introduced by Maynard Smith and Price (Natu...
Abstract. We present a general model of stochastic evolution in games played by large populations of...
We analyze a dynamic implication of an evolutionary process in a population where both actions and n...
In this paper, we investigate evolutionary games with the invasion process updating rules on three s...
Cooperative behavior that increases the fitness of others at a cost to oneself can be promoted by na...
abstract: This thesis explores and explains a stochastic model in Evolutionary Game Theory introduce...
Traditional game theory studies strategic interactions in which the agents make rational decisions. ...
We analyze dynamic local interaction in population games where the local interaction structure (mode...
In this paper we develop a dynamical theory of coevolution in ecological communities. The derivation...
Population learning in dynamic economies has been traditionally studied in over-simplified settings ...
Cooperative behavior that increases the fitness of others at a cost to oneself can be promoted by na...
Staudigl M. Co-evolutionary dynamics and Bayesian interaction games. International Journal of Game T...
In a Bayesian interaction game players have diverse preferences and are randomly matched according t...
This paper studies the co-evolution of networks and play in the context of finite population potenti...
Population structure can have a significant effect on evolution. For some systems with sufficient sy...
We extend the notion of Evolutionarily Stable Strategies introduced by Maynard Smith and Price (Natu...
Abstract. We present a general model of stochastic evolution in games played by large populations of...
We analyze a dynamic implication of an evolutionary process in a population where both actions and n...
In this paper, we investigate evolutionary games with the invasion process updating rules on three s...
Cooperative behavior that increases the fitness of others at a cost to oneself can be promoted by na...
abstract: This thesis explores and explains a stochastic model in Evolutionary Game Theory introduce...
Traditional game theory studies strategic interactions in which the agents make rational decisions. ...
We analyze dynamic local interaction in population games where the local interaction structure (mode...
In this paper we develop a dynamical theory of coevolution in ecological communities. The derivation...
Population learning in dynamic economies has been traditionally studied in over-simplified settings ...
Cooperative behavior that increases the fitness of others at a cost to oneself can be promoted by na...