This paper presents a complete, choice-based, axiomatic Bayesian decision theory. It introduces a new choice set consisting of information-contingent plans for choosing actions and bets and subjective expected utility model with effect-dependent utility functions and action-dependent subjective probabilities which, in conjunction with the updating of the probabilities using Bayes' rule, gives rise to a unique prior and a set of action-dependent posterior probabilities representing the decision maker's prior and posterior beliefs.
As stochastic independence is essential to the mathematical development of probability theory, it se...
Bayesian decision analysis supports principled decision making in complex domains. This textbook tak...
When preferences are such that there is no unique additive prior, the issue of which updating rule t...
This paper presents a complete, choice-based, axiomatic Bayesian decision theory. It introduces a ne...
This paper presents a complete, choice-based, axiomatic Bayesian decision theory. It introduces a ne...
This paper states necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence, uniqueness, and updating ac...
Abstract In this paper, I present an axiomatic choice theory of Bayesian decision makers and define ...
Bayesian decision theorists argue that rational agents should always perform acts that maximize subj...
A subjective expected utility agent is given information about the state of the world in the form of...
This paper provides new foundations for Bayesian Decision Theory based on a representation theorem f...
AbstractThis paper presents a new axiomatic decision theory for choice under uncertainty. Unlike Bay...
This paper presents a new axiomatic decision theory for choice under uncertainty. Unlike Bayesian de...
One central issue in philosophy of probability concerns the interpretation of the very notion of pro...
We present here a Bayesian framework of risk perception. This framework encompasses plausibility jud...
Bayesian decision making, Subjective probabilities, Prior distributions, Beliefs, D80, D81, D82,
As stochastic independence is essential to the mathematical development of probability theory, it se...
Bayesian decision analysis supports principled decision making in complex domains. This textbook tak...
When preferences are such that there is no unique additive prior, the issue of which updating rule t...
This paper presents a complete, choice-based, axiomatic Bayesian decision theory. It introduces a ne...
This paper presents a complete, choice-based, axiomatic Bayesian decision theory. It introduces a ne...
This paper states necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence, uniqueness, and updating ac...
Abstract In this paper, I present an axiomatic choice theory of Bayesian decision makers and define ...
Bayesian decision theorists argue that rational agents should always perform acts that maximize subj...
A subjective expected utility agent is given information about the state of the world in the form of...
This paper provides new foundations for Bayesian Decision Theory based on a representation theorem f...
AbstractThis paper presents a new axiomatic decision theory for choice under uncertainty. Unlike Bay...
This paper presents a new axiomatic decision theory for choice under uncertainty. Unlike Bayesian de...
One central issue in philosophy of probability concerns the interpretation of the very notion of pro...
We present here a Bayesian framework of risk perception. This framework encompasses plausibility jud...
Bayesian decision making, Subjective probabilities, Prior distributions, Beliefs, D80, D81, D82,
As stochastic independence is essential to the mathematical development of probability theory, it se...
Bayesian decision analysis supports principled decision making in complex domains. This textbook tak...
When preferences are such that there is no unique additive prior, the issue of which updating rule t...