Add to ORKGUsing a stylized oligopoly model, we analyze the effect of cartel deterring fines, taking into consideration exemptions granted to cartel members cooperating with the competition authorities. We conclude that the fines can act as a deterrent to breaking collusive agreements, thus stabilizing the cartel. Copyright � 2007 The Authors; Journal compilation � 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Previous research exploring the effect of corporate leniency programs has mod-elled the oligopoly st...
Abstract: Among the anti-competitive practices sanctioned by competition law, cartel is the most har...
Antitrust authorities in many countries have been trying to establish appropriate competition polici...
This paper studies the effect of leniency programs on the stability of cartels under two different r...
We analyze maximal cartel prices in infnitely-repeated oligopoly models under leniency where fines a...
We analyze how leniency affects cartel pricing in an infinitely repeated oligopoly model where the f...
The most significant violation of antitrust law in industrial economics is cartel formation. A price...
Cartels remain widespread and constitute a major problem for society. Leniency policies reduce or ca...
The paper focuses on the theory and practice of antitrust action in detecting and deterring cartels ...
We analyze significant challenges and pitfalls faced by antitrust authorities in the implementation ...
Leniency programs as a tool for cartel detection and cartel destabilization, have been implemented s...
Previous research exploring the effect of corporate leniency programs has modelled the oligopoly sta...
Among the anti-competitive practices sanctioned by competition law, cartel is the most harmful to th...
The present assessment focuses the attention on the antitrust action in detecting and fighting oligo...
To deter and punish illegal collusions antitrust authorities run costly investigations and levy fine...
Previous research exploring the effect of corporate leniency programs has mod-elled the oligopoly st...
Abstract: Among the anti-competitive practices sanctioned by competition law, cartel is the most har...
Antitrust authorities in many countries have been trying to establish appropriate competition polici...
This paper studies the effect of leniency programs on the stability of cartels under two different r...
We analyze maximal cartel prices in infnitely-repeated oligopoly models under leniency where fines a...
We analyze how leniency affects cartel pricing in an infinitely repeated oligopoly model where the f...
The most significant violation of antitrust law in industrial economics is cartel formation. A price...
Cartels remain widespread and constitute a major problem for society. Leniency policies reduce or ca...
The paper focuses on the theory and practice of antitrust action in detecting and deterring cartels ...
We analyze significant challenges and pitfalls faced by antitrust authorities in the implementation ...
Leniency programs as a tool for cartel detection and cartel destabilization, have been implemented s...
Previous research exploring the effect of corporate leniency programs has modelled the oligopoly sta...
Among the anti-competitive practices sanctioned by competition law, cartel is the most harmful to th...
The present assessment focuses the attention on the antitrust action in detecting and fighting oligo...
To deter and punish illegal collusions antitrust authorities run costly investigations and levy fine...
Previous research exploring the effect of corporate leniency programs has mod-elled the oligopoly st...
Abstract: Among the anti-competitive practices sanctioned by competition law, cartel is the most har...
Antitrust authorities in many countries have been trying to establish appropriate competition polici...