EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY AS A SPIN SYSTEM

Očitno je, da se naše podnebje spreminja in s tem ustvarja globalni problem, s katerim se moramo spopasti na mednarodni ravni. Podnebne spremembe so zato obravnavane kot primer največje socialne dileme, s katero se človeštvo sooča. Zakaj? Učinki podnebnih sprememb niso enakomerno razporejeni po celem svetu. Rezultat je klasičen problem, ki se ustvari kadar imamo opravka z javnimi dobrinami. Globalno-podnebni problem lahko uspešno rešimo samo na način, ki bo zagotovil mednarodno koordinacijo skupnih aktivnosti, kjer bodo sodelovale vse države sveta. Stroški posamezne države se lahko kaj hitro izračunajo, medtem ko bodo koristi porazdeljene med vse "igralce", neodvisno od njihovih dejanskih prispevkov k trajnostnemu razvoju. Evolucijska teorija iger je eno izmed najprimernejših teoretičnih orodij za preučevanje izzivov na področju podnebnih sprememb, s pomočjo katere bomo definirali glavne kriterije za evolucijo uspešnega sodelovanja. Svet je spoznal, da obvladovanje podnebnih sprememb povzroča stroške in zato bo nagnjenost k onesnaževanju vedno prisotna. Zato se vprašamo, ali lahko stohastični vplivi, kompleksne interakcijske mreže in koevolucija v podnebni igri zvišajo verjetnost prevzema čistejše strategije? Uporabljene so metode statistične fizike, Monte Carlo simulacije in igra zapornikove dileme z namenom podati nove odgovore na vprašanje kako rešiti naše podnebje in zaustaviti globalno segrevanje. Zapornikova dilema je še posebej primerna, saj proučuje evolucijo sodelovanja med sebičnimi posamezniki, kjer je kooperacija vprašljiva zaradi mamljivosti izbire strategije defekcije, hkrati pa lahko dilemo obravnavamo kot spinski sistem, in na ta način vpeljemo fizikalni pristop obravnave podnebnega problema.It is obvious that the climate change is underway, constituting a pressing global problem that needs to be dealt with at the global level. Tackling climate change means tackling the biggest social dilemma in the human history. Why? Because the adverse effects of climate change are not equally distributed across the world, the result being that this is a classical problem of dealing with global goods on a massive scale. Climate change mitigation can be successful only if the whole world will undertake an internationally coordinated collective action. Costs to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases can be easily calculated for each individual, but benefits of the successful reduction will be distributed among all the "players", independently of their actual contributions to sustainable development. Evolutionary game theory provides a suitable theoretical framework for studying the challenges of climate change, and we will reveal the main criteria for the successful evolution of cooperation. It has namely become painfully obvious that alleviating the negative consequences of the climate change will be costly, and accordingly, the temptations to pollute will always be present. Thus, we ask whether unpredictability, complex interaction networks and coevolution can increase the probability of adopting the cleaner strategy? We employ methods of statistical physics, Monte Carlo simulations and the spatial prisoner\u27s dilemma game in order to provide new insights and answers that may help us to save our climate by stopping the adverse changes. The prisoner\u27s dilemma game is particularly suited as it captures the essence of the problem when cooperative individuals are faced with temptations to resorting to the defective strategy, while at the same time the dilemma can be treated as a spin system, thus enabling a physics-inspired treatment of the climate problem