LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE FINANCIAL TURMOIL FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF STRUCTURAL FINANCES

Finančna kriza, ki ima svoje korenine v ameriškem nepremičninskem trgu, je hitro prerasla v svetovno gospodarsko recesijo. Vzrok temu je bila izjemna povezanost finančnega sistema, z izpostavljenostjo drugorazrednim hipotekarnim posojilom ter ugodna pravna pravila, ki so dovoljevala prenos tveganja na druge finančne subjekte in investitorje. Prenos kreditnega tveganja je omogočal institut listinjenja, ki v osnovi predstavlja izdajo vrednostnih papirjev, na podlagi kritnega premoženja. Vrednost tem vrednostnim papirjem je predstavljal bodoči denarni tok olistinjenih hipotekarnih posojil. Ko so kreditojemalci, zaradi povečane referenčne obrestne mere, prenehali plačevati svoje anuitetepremije imetnikom teh vrednostnih papirjev niso bile izplačane. Posebnost teh vrednostnih papirjev je netransparenten način njihove kreacije, kjer se ni vedelo kakšno kritje vsebujejo. Zaradi takšne strukture na emisije različnih bonitetnih ocen, jih imenujemo strukturirani finančni instrumenti. So pa hipotekarna posojila bila kritno premoženje samo določeni vrsti strukturiranih finančnih instrumentov, ostali so tako vsebovali kritje v delih emisij drugih strukturiranih finančnih instrumentov in tako se je nadaljevalo do izjemno velike netransparentnosti in negotovosti. Ko investitorjem niso bile več izplačane premije, je trg zgubil zaupanje v vse vrste strukturiranih finančnih instrumentov. Tudi v tiste, ki niso bili osnovani na drugorazrednih hipotekarnih posojilih. Investitorji so se začeli umikati in nastajale so težave z likvidnostjo - domine so padale. Diplomsko delo uvodoma predstavlja korelacijo nepremičninskega trga in trga finančnih instrumentov ter tako postavlja strukturirane finančne instrumente v kontekst finančne krize. Bistvo pričujočega dela pa je v predstavitvi okoliščin in interpovezanosti finančnih instrumentov, ki so botrovale nastanku finančne krize. Pravna pravila, ki so nalagala finančnim institucijam kapitalsko ustreznost glede na njihovo izpostavljenost, so bila sprva zastarela, kasneje pa nezadostna in tako omogočala kapitalsko arbitražo s pomočjo listinjenja. Agencije za ocenjevanje bonitete so podajale najvišjim (ne najvarnejšim delom emisij) svoje najvišje ocene in tako pretentale »naivne« investitorje ter celotni trg.The financial turmoil, having its background in the US real estate market, quickly outgrew into a global economic recession. The cause of this was the exceptional connectedness of the financial system based on subprime mortgages and favorable regulatory rules supporting risk transfer to other market participants and investors. Credit risk transfer was made possible with the means of securitization, which designates the issuance of securities on the basis of assets as collateral. The value of such securities was derived from the future cash flow of the securitized mortgage loans. When borrowers, because of the increased interest rate, stopped paying their annuitiespremiums to holders of these securities were not paid. An important factor of such securities, was the intransparent manner of their creation, where one did not know the collateral they were holding. Because of such structuring on tranches of diverse ratings, they are known as structural finances. However, mortgage loans were not always the collateral of such structural finances, as tranches of other structural finances were used as collateral, which continued to grave intransparency and uncertainty. When investors stopped receiving their premiums, the market lost confidence in all sorts of structural finances. Including the ones not backed by subprime mortgage loans. Investors started pulling out and liquidity issues started to arise – the dominos were falling. In the introduction the diploma presents the correlation between the real estate market and the market of financial instruments and in such way introduces structural finances in the context of the financial turmoil. The essence of the work is in the presentation of the circumstances and interconnectivity of financial instruments that led to the crises. Regulatory rules that laid the capital adequacy rules for the exposure of financial institutions were at first obsolete, later inadequate, and so enabled capital arbitrage (also regulatory arbitrage) with the help of securitization. In addition credit rating agencies gave the highest (not safest) tranches their highest ratings and in doing so deluded the “naive” investors and the market