The Influence of Corporate Governance on Listed and Non-listed Companies

[[abstract]]ABSTRACT Past research focused on the relation between corporate governance and corporate performance among the listed companies in Taiwan, not including the non-listed companies. This study included both of the listed companies and the non-listed companies in Taiwan as the samples to examine the relation between the corporate governance and corporate performance, and compared the effects between two groups. For the listed companies, the results indicate that the deviation of seat control rights from cash flow rights, outside director shareholdings, manager shareholdings, institutional shareholdings, blockholder shareholdings and directors and supervisors shareholdings have significant positive impacts on corporate performance; the deviation of voting rights from cash flow rights, CEO dualitya, and pledge ratio of board directors and supervisors have significant negative impacts on corporate performance. On the other hand, for the non-listed companies, the results show that manager shareholdings, blockholder shareholding, directors and supervisors shareholdings have significant positive impacts on corporate performance; outside director shareholdings and institutional shareholdings have significant negative impacts on corporate performance. It is noted that some corporate governance variables have significantly different impacts on the corporate performance in the listed companies and the non-listed companies. The results show that the deviation of voting rights from cash flow rights, board size, outside director shareholdings and institutional shareholdings have significant differences in the regression model between the two groups