A series of experiments compares bargaining behavior under three different settings: no arbitration, conventional and final offer arbitration. Under no arbitration disputes with zero payoffs were around 10%, while the pie was equally split in less than half of the cases. Under conventional arbitration - where the arbitrator is free in choosing his award - every third negotiation ended in dispute giving evidence for a modified chilling effect. Under final offer arbitration – where the arbitrator has to award to the bargainers either one of their final offers - there was only a small increase of disputes while equal splits have doubled to 80%. The experiment shows final offer arbitration, though having lower dispute rates, to interfer more wi...
We propose an arbitration model framework that generalizes many previous quantitative models of fina...
We collect experimental evidence on a modified version of the standard ultimatum game in which the r...
Instead of implementing efficient states, we observe that negotiations often end with inefficient ou...
This study develops a model of bargaining that demonstrates that an interest arbitration procedure w...
Increasingly, arbitration is becoming used to resolve bargaining disputes in a variety of settings. ...
Binding arbitration is a common method of alternative dispute resolution used in resolving labor dis...
The emerging empirical literature on the economics of arbitration has focused primarily on the behav...
We consider a model of bargaining by concessions where agents can terminate negotiations by acceptin...
This paper analyzes and compares arbitrator behavior under conventional and final-offer arbitration....
In this paper we introduce a model of arbitration decision making which generalizes several previous...
We consider a model of bargaining by concessions where agents can terminate negotiations by acceptin...
We run a series of experiments to compare the well known arbitration scheme FOA (Final Offer Arbitra...
The purpose of the present paper was to examine the effects of different dispute resolution procedur...
Abstract We consider a model of bargaining by concessions where agents can terminate negotiations by...
This paper presents results from a controlled laboratory study of bargaining behavior and dispute ra...
We propose an arbitration model framework that generalizes many previous quantitative models of fina...
We collect experimental evidence on a modified version of the standard ultimatum game in which the r...
Instead of implementing efficient states, we observe that negotiations often end with inefficient ou...
This study develops a model of bargaining that demonstrates that an interest arbitration procedure w...
Increasingly, arbitration is becoming used to resolve bargaining disputes in a variety of settings. ...
Binding arbitration is a common method of alternative dispute resolution used in resolving labor dis...
The emerging empirical literature on the economics of arbitration has focused primarily on the behav...
We consider a model of bargaining by concessions where agents can terminate negotiations by acceptin...
This paper analyzes and compares arbitrator behavior under conventional and final-offer arbitration....
In this paper we introduce a model of arbitration decision making which generalizes several previous...
We consider a model of bargaining by concessions where agents can terminate negotiations by acceptin...
We run a series of experiments to compare the well known arbitration scheme FOA (Final Offer Arbitra...
The purpose of the present paper was to examine the effects of different dispute resolution procedur...
Abstract We consider a model of bargaining by concessions where agents can terminate negotiations by...
This paper presents results from a controlled laboratory study of bargaining behavior and dispute ra...
We propose an arbitration model framework that generalizes many previous quantitative models of fina...
We collect experimental evidence on a modified version of the standard ultimatum game in which the r...
Instead of implementing efficient states, we observe that negotiations often end with inefficient ou...