This paper develops the generalised Nash bargaining solution for a bargaining co-operative selling its output to a single buyer. Three assumptions for co-operative members' behaviour are examined: profit maximisation, co-operative surplus maximisation and maximising members' price. Solutions are compared and comparative statics presented for these alternative assumptions and the bargaining over price and quantity transacted. The most striking feature of the results is that pursuing the objective of maximising members' price does not necessarily lead to the highest members' price Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd/University of Adelaide and Flinders University 2006..
SIGLEAvailable from British Library Document Supply Centre-DSC:8490.4338(92/16) / BLDSC - British Li...
Haake C-J, Upmann T, Duman P. Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability and Efficiency ...
The shapes of the bargaining sets for firm-union negotiations are rigorously analyzed in two cases, ...
This paper analyzes and proposes a solution to the transfer pricing problem from the point of view o...
A modified Nash Bargaining models is employed to analyze the practice of sharing the revenue (as wel...
This article establishes the relationship between the static axiomatic theory of bargaining and the ...
'The authors propose a solution for bargaining problems where coalitions are bargainers. The solutio...
This paper examines the effect of introducing profit-sharing arrangements into union-firm contracts....
In the paper a game-theoretical model is set up to describe the conflict situation in which the memb...
Negotiation is a pervasive feature of social exchange. Bargaining theory and the related models exa...
In the 1950s, the Nobel Prize winner John F. Nash has shown that under certain conditions, the best ...
We propose and analyze a new solution concept, the R solution, for three-person, transferable utilit...
We propose and analyze a new solution concept, theRsolution, for three-person, transferable utility,...
This paper presents a logical extension of Nash’s Cooperative Bargaining Theory. We introduce a conc...
The coalitional Nash bargaining solution is defined to be the core allocation for which the product ...
SIGLEAvailable from British Library Document Supply Centre-DSC:8490.4338(92/16) / BLDSC - British Li...
Haake C-J, Upmann T, Duman P. Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability and Efficiency ...
The shapes of the bargaining sets for firm-union negotiations are rigorously analyzed in two cases, ...
This paper analyzes and proposes a solution to the transfer pricing problem from the point of view o...
A modified Nash Bargaining models is employed to analyze the practice of sharing the revenue (as wel...
This article establishes the relationship between the static axiomatic theory of bargaining and the ...
'The authors propose a solution for bargaining problems where coalitions are bargainers. The solutio...
This paper examines the effect of introducing profit-sharing arrangements into union-firm contracts....
In the paper a game-theoretical model is set up to describe the conflict situation in which the memb...
Negotiation is a pervasive feature of social exchange. Bargaining theory and the related models exa...
In the 1950s, the Nobel Prize winner John F. Nash has shown that under certain conditions, the best ...
We propose and analyze a new solution concept, the R solution, for three-person, transferable utilit...
We propose and analyze a new solution concept, theRsolution, for three-person, transferable utility,...
This paper presents a logical extension of Nash’s Cooperative Bargaining Theory. We introduce a conc...
The coalitional Nash bargaining solution is defined to be the core allocation for which the product ...
SIGLEAvailable from British Library Document Supply Centre-DSC:8490.4338(92/16) / BLDSC - British Li...
Haake C-J, Upmann T, Duman P. Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability and Efficiency ...
The shapes of the bargaining sets for firm-union negotiations are rigorously analyzed in two cases, ...