We examine the role of differentiation among competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs) in nearly 1,200 U.S. cities in 1999 and 2002, before and after a valuation crash affecting communications firms. We test and reject the null hypothesis of homogeneous competitors. We also find strong evidence that differentiated CLECs account for both potential market demand and the business strategies of competitors when making their entry decisions. Finally, product heterogeneity in markets in 1999 helps predict how the structure of markets evolved through 2002. We conclude that the policy debate for local telecommunications regulation should account for differentiated behavior. Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2006.
A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "One of the pri...
This paper studies the effects of a country’s regulatory setting and competitive environment the per...
We test the effect of entry on the tariff choices of incumbent cellular firms. We relate the change ...
Weexamine the role of differentiationamongcompetitive local exchange carriers (CLECs) in nearly 1,20...
We examine the role of differentiation strategies in the evolution of local telecommunication compet...
Rosston and Brad Wimmer for providing us data on ILECs. All errors are our responsibility. The autho...
The authors examine the role of differentiation strategies for entry behavior in markets for local t...
Although competitive local exchange carriers ( CLECs ) collectively have gained considerable market ...
This article analyses current policy issues involved in the development of local telecommunications ...
This paper focuses on the effects of within and between standards competition and competition betwee...
We extend Bresnahan and Reiss’s (1991) model of local oligopoly to allow firm entry and exit over ti...
We extend Bresnahan and Reiss’s (1991) model of local oligopoly to allow firm entry and exit over ti...
The 1996 Telecommunications Act opened the monopolistic U.S. local telephone industry to new entrant...
Local telecommunications competition was an important goal of the 1996 Telecommunications Act. We ev...
Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/115904/1/rand12109.pdfhttp://deepblue.l...
A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "One of the pri...
This paper studies the effects of a country’s regulatory setting and competitive environment the per...
We test the effect of entry on the tariff choices of incumbent cellular firms. We relate the change ...
Weexamine the role of differentiationamongcompetitive local exchange carriers (CLECs) in nearly 1,20...
We examine the role of differentiation strategies in the evolution of local telecommunication compet...
Rosston and Brad Wimmer for providing us data on ILECs. All errors are our responsibility. The autho...
The authors examine the role of differentiation strategies for entry behavior in markets for local t...
Although competitive local exchange carriers ( CLECs ) collectively have gained considerable market ...
This article analyses current policy issues involved in the development of local telecommunications ...
This paper focuses on the effects of within and between standards competition and competition betwee...
We extend Bresnahan and Reiss’s (1991) model of local oligopoly to allow firm entry and exit over ti...
We extend Bresnahan and Reiss’s (1991) model of local oligopoly to allow firm entry and exit over ti...
The 1996 Telecommunications Act opened the monopolistic U.S. local telephone industry to new entrant...
Local telecommunications competition was an important goal of the 1996 Telecommunications Act. We ev...
Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/115904/1/rand12109.pdfhttp://deepblue.l...
A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "One of the pri...
This paper studies the effects of a country’s regulatory setting and competitive environment the per...
We test the effect of entry on the tariff choices of incumbent cellular firms. We relate the change ...