A structural approach is used to examine who matches with whom. A two-sided matching model that allows for marital sorting in response to marriage market flexibility and agents' preferences is utilized. Estimation is based on imbedding the numerical solution of a matching model within a maximum likelihood procedure. Results indicate that wage is more desirable than education in predicting marriageability for white men; education is more desirable for black men. The marriage market for white men is more flexible. Both marriage market flexibility and the chance of being classified correctly using agents' wage and education decrease with age for white men.
We construct a frictionless matching model of the marriage market where women have bidimensional att...
This paper examines how equilibrium sorting takes place in marriage markets in India where matches a...
Frictions are a potentially important feature of many two-sided settings, for example, in the marria...
This paper provides an assessment of the implementation of a canonical two-sided matching model usin...
This paper develops a method suggested by the theory to estimate the structural parameters of a two-...
Using a transferable utility model of the marriage market, the paper derives a statistic to measure ...
To what extent can marriage market conditions explain differences in marriage and employment decisio...
This paper uses the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series of the 2000 Census to examine how equilib...
A marriage matching model is estimated to quantify the share of returns to education that is realize...
This paper develops a joint model of the marriage and partner choice decisions. Each individual choo...
We propose a search-matching model of the marriage market that extends Shimer and Smith (2000) to al...
We extend the search-matching model of the marriage market of Shimer and Smith (2000) to allow for l...
The matching algorithm in a dynamic marriage market model is described in this first of two companio...
A dynamic, two-sex, age-structured marriage model is presented. Part 1 focused on first marriage onl...
Many social processes studied by demographers can be viewed as two-sided matching markets. For examp...
We construct a frictionless matching model of the marriage market where women have bidimensional att...
This paper examines how equilibrium sorting takes place in marriage markets in India where matches a...
Frictions are a potentially important feature of many two-sided settings, for example, in the marria...
This paper provides an assessment of the implementation of a canonical two-sided matching model usin...
This paper develops a method suggested by the theory to estimate the structural parameters of a two-...
Using a transferable utility model of the marriage market, the paper derives a statistic to measure ...
To what extent can marriage market conditions explain differences in marriage and employment decisio...
This paper uses the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series of the 2000 Census to examine how equilib...
A marriage matching model is estimated to quantify the share of returns to education that is realize...
This paper develops a joint model of the marriage and partner choice decisions. Each individual choo...
We propose a search-matching model of the marriage market that extends Shimer and Smith (2000) to al...
We extend the search-matching model of the marriage market of Shimer and Smith (2000) to allow for l...
The matching algorithm in a dynamic marriage market model is described in this first of two companio...
A dynamic, two-sex, age-structured marriage model is presented. Part 1 focused on first marriage onl...
Many social processes studied by demographers can be viewed as two-sided matching markets. For examp...
We construct a frictionless matching model of the marriage market where women have bidimensional att...
This paper examines how equilibrium sorting takes place in marriage markets in India where matches a...
Frictions are a potentially important feature of many two-sided settings, for example, in the marria...