Add to ORKGOne reason why countries service their external debts is the fear that default might lead to shrinkage of international trade. If so, then creditors should systematically lend more to countries with which they share closer trade links. We develop a simple theoretical model to capture this intuition, then test and corroborate this idea.
Why do countries repay their debts? If countries in default have sufficient opportu-nities to save, ...
This paper studies from an empirical point of view if countries that default or restructure their fo...
There has been a growing concern about the vulnerability of emerging countries to fluc-tuations in i...
This paper estimates the effect of sovereign debt renegotiation on international trade. Sovereign de...
This paper estimates the effect of sovereign debt renegotiation on international trade. Sovereign de...
We present a unified model of sovereign debt, trade credit and international reserves. Our model sho...
The ability of creditors to impose trade sanctions has been one of the workhorse arguments to explai...
We present a unified model of sovereign debt, trade credit and international reserves. Our model sho...
We present a unified model of sovereign debt, trade credit and international reserves. Our model sho...
Why would a sovereign government, immune from bankruptcy procedures and with few assets that could b...
A poor country with volatile export prices borrows in international markets. When debt is denominate...
We develop a multicountry model in which default in one country triggers default in other coun-tries...
The traditional view of sovereign debt as a relationship between a developing country government and...
We present a model of sovereign debt in which, contrary to conventional wisdom, government defaults ...
We propose a novel theory to explain why sovereigns borrow on both domestic and international market...
Why do countries repay their debts? If countries in default have sufficient opportu-nities to save, ...
This paper studies from an empirical point of view if countries that default or restructure their fo...
There has been a growing concern about the vulnerability of emerging countries to fluc-tuations in i...
This paper estimates the effect of sovereign debt renegotiation on international trade. Sovereign de...
This paper estimates the effect of sovereign debt renegotiation on international trade. Sovereign de...
We present a unified model of sovereign debt, trade credit and international reserves. Our model sho...
The ability of creditors to impose trade sanctions has been one of the workhorse arguments to explai...
We present a unified model of sovereign debt, trade credit and international reserves. Our model sho...
We present a unified model of sovereign debt, trade credit and international reserves. Our model sho...
Why would a sovereign government, immune from bankruptcy procedures and with few assets that could b...
A poor country with volatile export prices borrows in international markets. When debt is denominate...
We develop a multicountry model in which default in one country triggers default in other coun-tries...
The traditional view of sovereign debt as a relationship between a developing country government and...
We present a model of sovereign debt in which, contrary to conventional wisdom, government defaults ...
We propose a novel theory to explain why sovereigns borrow on both domestic and international market...
Why do countries repay their debts? If countries in default have sufficient opportu-nities to save, ...
This paper studies from an empirical point of view if countries that default or restructure their fo...
There has been a growing concern about the vulnerability of emerging countries to fluc-tuations in i...