Add to ORKGWe identify two sufficient conditions for games with strategic complementarities to have a unique equilibrium that is "strongly coalition-proof," that is, immune to incentive-compatible deviations by coalitions. If a Nash equilibrium is unique, then it is strongly coalition-proof. Also, if each player's payoff is increasing (respectively, decreasing) in the other players' strategies, then the maximum (respectively, minimal) equilibrium is the unique strongly coalition-proof equilibrium. We offer several applications of these results, including one to the contracting model of Hart and Moore.
We study strong Nash equilibriain mixed strategies in finite games. A Nash equilibrium is strong if ...
Let N be a set of players, C the set of permissible coalitions and G an N-playerstrategic game. A pr...
We show that, if a game satisfies the conditions of anonymity, monotone externality, and strategic s...
We characterize the agreements that the players of a noncooperative game may reach when they can com...
We characterize the set of agreements that the players of a non-cooperative game may reach when they...
We characterize the set of agreements that the players of a non-cooperative game may reach when they...
We characterize the agreements that the players of a noncooperative game may reach when they can com...
The purpose of this paper is to clarify the properties of a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium in an a...
We characterize the agreements that the players of a noncooperative game may reach when they can com...
We characterize the agreements that the players of a noncooperative game may reach when they can com...
We study strong Nash equilibria in mixed strategies in finite games. A Nash equilibrium is strong if...
We study strong Nash equilibria in mixed strategies in finite games. A Nash equilibrium is strong if...
We study strong Nash equilibria in mixed strategies in finite games. A Nash equilibrium is strong if...
We study strong Nash equilibria in mixed strategies in finite games. A Nash equilibrium is strong if...
We study strong Nash equilibria in mixed strategies in finite games. A Nash equilibrium is strong if...
We study strong Nash equilibriain mixed strategies in finite games. A Nash equilibrium is strong if ...
Let N be a set of players, C the set of permissible coalitions and G an N-playerstrategic game. A pr...
We show that, if a game satisfies the conditions of anonymity, monotone externality, and strategic s...
We characterize the agreements that the players of a noncooperative game may reach when they can com...
We characterize the set of agreements that the players of a non-cooperative game may reach when they...
We characterize the set of agreements that the players of a non-cooperative game may reach when they...
We characterize the agreements that the players of a noncooperative game may reach when they can com...
The purpose of this paper is to clarify the properties of a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium in an a...
We characterize the agreements that the players of a noncooperative game may reach when they can com...
We characterize the agreements that the players of a noncooperative game may reach when they can com...
We study strong Nash equilibria in mixed strategies in finite games. A Nash equilibrium is strong if...
We study strong Nash equilibria in mixed strategies in finite games. A Nash equilibrium is strong if...
We study strong Nash equilibria in mixed strategies in finite games. A Nash equilibrium is strong if...
We study strong Nash equilibria in mixed strategies in finite games. A Nash equilibrium is strong if...
We study strong Nash equilibria in mixed strategies in finite games. A Nash equilibrium is strong if...
We study strong Nash equilibriain mixed strategies in finite games. A Nash equilibrium is strong if ...
Let N be a set of players, C the set of permissible coalitions and G an N-playerstrategic game. A pr...
We show that, if a game satisfies the conditions of anonymity, monotone externality, and strategic s...