This analysis employs a uniform 4th price sealed-bid auction to test the impact of endowment heterogeneity on participant bids. A mechanism to legitimize the wealth of participants consistent with prior research on endowments is employed. Second, unlike some previous literature, a mechanism to endogenously induce endowment heterogeneity is employed. Results from a Tobit analysis of participant bids indicate that endowment heterogeneity has no significant impact on bidding behaviour. Therefore, it is concluded that when wealth is legitimized within an experiment, bidding behaviour is more likely rational leading to more robust experimental results.
We experimentally analyze first and second price auctions where one bidder can achieve a comparative...
We use structural methods to assess equilibrium models of bidding with data from first-price auction...
We use structural methods to assess equilibrium models of bidding with data from first-price auction...
In experimental auctions, participants are asually given an initial endowment or cash compensation t...
In experimental auctions, participants are usually given an initial endowment or cash compensation t...
In experimental auctions, participants are usually given an initial endowment or cash compensation t...
We report the results of an experiment designed to test whether initial endowments affect value esti...
Abstract: We report the results of an experiment designed to test whether initial endowments affect ...
This paper investigates implications of some of the well established behavioral biases to the behavi...
We report the result of experiments designed to assess the effect of initial endowments on willingne...
We report the result of experiments designed to assess the effect of initial endowments on willingne...
We evaluate the impact of three auction mechanisms - the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism, the seco...
The dissertation examines modern auction theory using experimental economics as a research tool. Auc...
We design an experiment to test if the manner in which subjects receive the endowment has any bearin...
We experimentally analyze first and second price auctions where one bidder can achieve a comparative...
We experimentally analyze first and second price auctions where one bidder can achieve a comparative...
We use structural methods to assess equilibrium models of bidding with data from first-price auction...
We use structural methods to assess equilibrium models of bidding with data from first-price auction...
In experimental auctions, participants are asually given an initial endowment or cash compensation t...
In experimental auctions, participants are usually given an initial endowment or cash compensation t...
In experimental auctions, participants are usually given an initial endowment or cash compensation t...
We report the results of an experiment designed to test whether initial endowments affect value esti...
Abstract: We report the results of an experiment designed to test whether initial endowments affect ...
This paper investigates implications of some of the well established behavioral biases to the behavi...
We report the result of experiments designed to assess the effect of initial endowments on willingne...
We report the result of experiments designed to assess the effect of initial endowments on willingne...
We evaluate the impact of three auction mechanisms - the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism, the seco...
The dissertation examines modern auction theory using experimental economics as a research tool. Auc...
We design an experiment to test if the manner in which subjects receive the endowment has any bearin...
We experimentally analyze first and second price auctions where one bidder can achieve a comparative...
We experimentally analyze first and second price auctions where one bidder can achieve a comparative...
We use structural methods to assess equilibrium models of bidding with data from first-price auction...
We use structural methods to assess equilibrium models of bidding with data from first-price auction...