Add to ORKGThe paper exploits a unique social experiment carried out in 1988 in Sweden to identify the effect of monitoring on sickness absence. The treatment consists of postponing the first formal point of monitoring during a sickness absence spell, a requirement for a doctor’s certificate, from day eight to day fifteen. The experiment was conducted in two geographical areas, and the treatment group was randomized by birth date. The results show strong effects on sickness absence duration from extending the waiting period in both areas. On average, the durations increased by 6.6 percent. No effect on incidence of sickness absence is found. A heterogeneity analysis reveals that monitoring affects men more than women.Absenteeism; sickness insurance; m...
Risk adverse individuals demand a sickness insurance to cover the risk of income loss due to work in...
This paper examines the effect of the replacement rule of the Finnish sickness insurance syst...
In 1999, in Germany, the statutory sick pay level was increased from 80 to 100 percent of foregone e...
During the last decade several empirical studies have stressed the importance of norms and social in...
In 1998 the Swedish national sickness insurance policy changed to allow additional compensation from...
We analyse the impact of a social security reform that changed the costs incurred by firms due to si...
This paper examines the incentive effects caused by the interactions between unemployment insurance ...
We examine the effect of the replacement rule of a social insurance system on sickness absence. The ...
The paper examines whether a worker's sick absence behaviour influences the risk of becoming unemplo...
We analyze the consequences for sickness absence of a selective softening of job security legislatio...
Objectives Policies have been introduced to reduce sickness absence, but their effectiveness is larg...
In this paper we use detailed employment records to study to what extent sickness absence among work...
In order to get a more complete picture of how labor supply is affected by economic incentives, the ...
In most countries, employers are financially responsible for sick pay during an initial period of a ...
Screening Efficiency in Sickness Insurance: Evidence from a Spell Limit Reform I estimate the effect...
Risk adverse individuals demand a sickness insurance to cover the risk of income loss due to work in...
This paper examines the effect of the replacement rule of the Finnish sickness insurance syst...
In 1999, in Germany, the statutory sick pay level was increased from 80 to 100 percent of foregone e...
During the last decade several empirical studies have stressed the importance of norms and social in...
In 1998 the Swedish national sickness insurance policy changed to allow additional compensation from...
We analyse the impact of a social security reform that changed the costs incurred by firms due to si...
This paper examines the incentive effects caused by the interactions between unemployment insurance ...
We examine the effect of the replacement rule of a social insurance system on sickness absence. The ...
The paper examines whether a worker's sick absence behaviour influences the risk of becoming unemplo...
We analyze the consequences for sickness absence of a selective softening of job security legislatio...
Objectives Policies have been introduced to reduce sickness absence, but their effectiveness is larg...
In this paper we use detailed employment records to study to what extent sickness absence among work...
In order to get a more complete picture of how labor supply is affected by economic incentives, the ...
In most countries, employers are financially responsible for sick pay during an initial period of a ...
Screening Efficiency in Sickness Insurance: Evidence from a Spell Limit Reform I estimate the effect...
Risk adverse individuals demand a sickness insurance to cover the risk of income loss due to work in...
This paper examines the effect of the replacement rule of the Finnish sickness insurance syst...
In 1999, in Germany, the statutory sick pay level was increased from 80 to 100 percent of foregone e...