Registering originative business contracts allows entrepreneurs and creditors to choose, and courts to enforce market-friendly “contract” rules that protect innocent third parties when adjudicating disputes on subsequent contracts. This reduces information asymmetry for third parties, which enhances impersonal trade. It does so without seriously weakening property rights, because it is rightholders who choose or activate the legal rules and can, therefore, minimize the cost of any possible weakening. Registries are essential not only to make the chosen rules public but to ensure rightholders’ commitment and avoid rule-gaming, because independent registries make rightholders’ choices verifiable by courts. The theory is supported by comparati...
This article develops and tests a theory of the institutions that make property rights viable, ensur...
In this paper we propose a theory of optimal property rights in a financial contracting setting. Fol...
To clarify the determinants and interaction of property rights and transaction costs, I study the de...
Governments and international development agencies often fail in their efforts to build and reform p...
Demand for law professionals in the conveyancing of property is decreasing because of market and ins...
A central theoretical premise is that firms internalize transactions that are not suited for formal ...
Contractual frictions are widely known to shape firm boundaries. But do better contracting instituti...
One of the most common problems in commercial transactions is the resolution of information asymmetr...
This paper highlights the role of intangible assets in a property rights model of firm organization ...
This paper considers a number of potential justifications for regulatory intervention aimed at overc...
The large, modern business corporation is frequently organized as a complex cluster of hundreds of c...
Most economic interactions happen in a context of sequential exchange in which innocent third partie...
Whether and how to recognize business enterprises as organizational entities and legal persons t...
Commerce, defined as the marketing of goods and services, is dependent on a tremendously complex set...
This working paper gives the preliminary results of a research project on the uses of notarized powe...
This article develops and tests a theory of the institutions that make property rights viable, ensur...
In this paper we propose a theory of optimal property rights in a financial contracting setting. Fol...
To clarify the determinants and interaction of property rights and transaction costs, I study the de...
Governments and international development agencies often fail in their efforts to build and reform p...
Demand for law professionals in the conveyancing of property is decreasing because of market and ins...
A central theoretical premise is that firms internalize transactions that are not suited for formal ...
Contractual frictions are widely known to shape firm boundaries. But do better contracting instituti...
One of the most common problems in commercial transactions is the resolution of information asymmetr...
This paper highlights the role of intangible assets in a property rights model of firm organization ...
This paper considers a number of potential justifications for regulatory intervention aimed at overc...
The large, modern business corporation is frequently organized as a complex cluster of hundreds of c...
Most economic interactions happen in a context of sequential exchange in which innocent third partie...
Whether and how to recognize business enterprises as organizational entities and legal persons t...
Commerce, defined as the marketing of goods and services, is dependent on a tremendously complex set...
This working paper gives the preliminary results of a research project on the uses of notarized powe...
This article develops and tests a theory of the institutions that make property rights viable, ensur...
In this paper we propose a theory of optimal property rights in a financial contracting setting. Fol...
To clarify the determinants and interaction of property rights and transaction costs, I study the de...