Add to ORKGWe find the sufficient conditions for the existence of multiple equilibria in Tullock-type contests, and show that asymmetric equilibria arise even under symmetric prize and cost structures. We then present existing contests where multiple equilibria exist under reasonably weak conditions.Rent-seeking Contest Asymmetric equilibrium Multiple equilibria
We analyze (non-deterministic) contests with anonymous contest success functions. There is no restri...
Contests are economic or social interactions in which two or more players expend costly resources in...
We show that under standard assumptions a Tullock contest with asymmetric information has a pure st...
We find the sufficient conditions for the existence of multiple equilibria in Tullock-type contests,...
We analyze existence, uniqueness and properties of equilibria in incompletely discriminating Tullock...
We show that the optimal prize structure of symmetric n-player Tullock tournaments assigns the entir...
We construct a generalized Tullock contest under complete information where contingent upon winning ...
We construct a generalized Tullock contest under complete information where contingent upon winning...
It is well known that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium does not exist for a two-player rent-seeking ...
The paper develops a simple theoretical framework for analyzing repeated contests. At each stage of ...
We show that the optimal prize structure of symmetric n-player Tullock tournaments assigns the entir...
We consider a rent-seeking contest of the kind introduced by Tullock (1980) in which two players com...
In imperfectly discriminating contests with symmetric valuations, equilibrium payoffs are positive s...
We consider a rent-seeking contest of the kind introduced by Tullock (1980) in which two players com...
Under standard assumptions about players’ cost functions, we show that a Tullock contest with asymme...
We analyze (non-deterministic) contests with anonymous contest success functions. There is no restri...
Contests are economic or social interactions in which two or more players expend costly resources in...
We show that under standard assumptions a Tullock contest with asymmetric information has a pure st...
We find the sufficient conditions for the existence of multiple equilibria in Tullock-type contests,...
We analyze existence, uniqueness and properties of equilibria in incompletely discriminating Tullock...
We show that the optimal prize structure of symmetric n-player Tullock tournaments assigns the entir...
We construct a generalized Tullock contest under complete information where contingent upon winning ...
We construct a generalized Tullock contest under complete information where contingent upon winning...
It is well known that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium does not exist for a two-player rent-seeking ...
The paper develops a simple theoretical framework for analyzing repeated contests. At each stage of ...
We show that the optimal prize structure of symmetric n-player Tullock tournaments assigns the entir...
We consider a rent-seeking contest of the kind introduced by Tullock (1980) in which two players com...
In imperfectly discriminating contests with symmetric valuations, equilibrium payoffs are positive s...
We consider a rent-seeking contest of the kind introduced by Tullock (1980) in which two players com...
Under standard assumptions about players’ cost functions, we show that a Tullock contest with asymme...
We analyze (non-deterministic) contests with anonymous contest success functions. There is no restri...
Contests are economic or social interactions in which two or more players expend costly resources in...
We show that under standard assumptions a Tullock contest with asymmetric information has a pure st...