This paper presents an investigation of subnational government bailouts in Germany. In the first part we briefly describe the system of fiscal federalism in Germany. The main part of the paper examines the bailout of two West German states. We identify the causes of the financial crisis in both states and examine the institutional settings as well as the ruling of the Constitutional Court that forced the federal government to provide bailout transfers. In addition, we investigate the impact these transfers had on the fiscal performance of both states. In a further section we provide evidence on bailouts of local governments by German states. A final section summarizes our results and presents policy conclusions.
Fiscal decentralization introduces the risk that subnational governments act fiscally irresponsible ...
How much leeway did governments have in designing bank bailouts and deciding on the height of interv...
The ‘market discipline’ approach to subnational finance requires that moral hazard derived from the ...
Based on dynamic game of incomplete information, this paper argues that subnational governments with...
In this paper, we examine whether decentralized decision making results in more efficient economic o...
Cooperative federations are usually characterized by the existence of bailout guarantees and intergo...
In 2009, Germany introduced a new debt rule in its federal constitution (Grundgesetz). The socalled ...
A demand based theory of sub-national debt bailouts is presented. It is shown that revenue sharing (...
We investigate the political determinants of risk premiums which subnational governments in Switzerl...
The German experience of the crisis was very different compared to those of most other countries in ...
I study whether bailouts of local governments carry electoral benefits for state governments with a ...
Trotz Kommunalaufsicht und Finanzausgleich befinden sich viele Kommunen seit Jahrzehnten in einer Ha...
The paper discusses moral hazard problems as a potential reason for the observed strong increase of ...
We investigate the political determinants of risk premiums which sub-national governments in Switze...
How much leeway did governments have in designing bank bailouts and deciding on the height of interv...
Fiscal decentralization introduces the risk that subnational governments act fiscally irresponsible ...
How much leeway did governments have in designing bank bailouts and deciding on the height of interv...
The ‘market discipline’ approach to subnational finance requires that moral hazard derived from the ...
Based on dynamic game of incomplete information, this paper argues that subnational governments with...
In this paper, we examine whether decentralized decision making results in more efficient economic o...
Cooperative federations are usually characterized by the existence of bailout guarantees and intergo...
In 2009, Germany introduced a new debt rule in its federal constitution (Grundgesetz). The socalled ...
A demand based theory of sub-national debt bailouts is presented. It is shown that revenue sharing (...
We investigate the political determinants of risk premiums which subnational governments in Switzerl...
The German experience of the crisis was very different compared to those of most other countries in ...
I study whether bailouts of local governments carry electoral benefits for state governments with a ...
Trotz Kommunalaufsicht und Finanzausgleich befinden sich viele Kommunen seit Jahrzehnten in einer Ha...
The paper discusses moral hazard problems as a potential reason for the observed strong increase of ...
We investigate the political determinants of risk premiums which sub-national governments in Switze...
How much leeway did governments have in designing bank bailouts and deciding on the height of interv...
Fiscal decentralization introduces the risk that subnational governments act fiscally irresponsible ...
How much leeway did governments have in designing bank bailouts and deciding on the height of interv...
The ‘market discipline’ approach to subnational finance requires that moral hazard derived from the ...