This paper studies endogenous mergers of complements with mixed bundling, by allowing both for joint and separate consumption. After merger, partner fi…rms decrease the price of the bundled system. Besides, when markets for individual components are suffi…ciently important, partner …firms raise prices of stand-alone products, exploiting their monopoly power in local markets and making substitute 'mix-and-match' composite products less attractive to consumers. Even though these effects favor the pro fitability of mergers, merging is not always an equilibrium outcome. The reason is that outsiders respond by cutting their prices to retain their market share, and mergers can be unprofitable when competition is intense. From a welfare analysis, ...
Industrial organization economists have made significant progress on consumer demand estimation in p...
This paper examines a simple model of strategic interactions among rms that face at least some of th...
Abstract A common view in antitrust analysis is that mergers of complements can have raising rivals'...
This paper studies endogenous mergers of complements with mixed bundling, by allowing both for joint...
In this paper, two pairs of complementors have to decide whether to merge and eventually bundle the...
In this paper, two pairs of complementors have to decide whether to merge and eventually bundle thei...
© 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. In this paper, the firms within two pairs of complementors decide w...
The static analysis shows that a merger among complementary input suppliers or complementary patent ...
The static analysis shows that a merger among complementary input suppliers or complementary patent ...
The static analysis shows that a merger among complementary input suppliers or complementary patent ...
This paper investigates the competitive effects of mergers involving producers of complementary good...
In this paper, the firms within two pairs of complementors decide whether to merge and eventually bu...
This paper analyzes the strategic decision to integrate by firms that produce complementary products...
This paper analyzes the strategic decision to integrate by firms that produce complementary products...
The endogenous merger model of Kamien and Zang (QJE, 1990) is generalized to price competition with ...
Industrial organization economists have made significant progress on consumer demand estimation in p...
This paper examines a simple model of strategic interactions among rms that face at least some of th...
Abstract A common view in antitrust analysis is that mergers of complements can have raising rivals'...
This paper studies endogenous mergers of complements with mixed bundling, by allowing both for joint...
In this paper, two pairs of complementors have to decide whether to merge and eventually bundle the...
In this paper, two pairs of complementors have to decide whether to merge and eventually bundle thei...
© 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. In this paper, the firms within two pairs of complementors decide w...
The static analysis shows that a merger among complementary input suppliers or complementary patent ...
The static analysis shows that a merger among complementary input suppliers or complementary patent ...
The static analysis shows that a merger among complementary input suppliers or complementary patent ...
This paper investigates the competitive effects of mergers involving producers of complementary good...
In this paper, the firms within two pairs of complementors decide whether to merge and eventually bu...
This paper analyzes the strategic decision to integrate by firms that produce complementary products...
This paper analyzes the strategic decision to integrate by firms that produce complementary products...
The endogenous merger model of Kamien and Zang (QJE, 1990) is generalized to price competition with ...
Industrial organization economists have made significant progress on consumer demand estimation in p...
This paper examines a simple model of strategic interactions among rms that face at least some of th...
Abstract A common view in antitrust analysis is that mergers of complements can have raising rivals'...