Add to ORKGThis paper examines the potential for adverse selection when farmers are offered a portfolio of insurance policies. We analyze the risk characteristics farmers who bought alternative insurance instruments in 1996-97. Inability to differentiate farmers according to risk types results in pooling equilibrium which may implicitly subsidize high risk farmers.Risk and Uncertainty,
The U.S. crop insurance market has several features that set it apart from other insurance markets. ...
This study focuses on how subsidized crop insurance affects the farm portfolio. Crop insurance progr...
The economic theory of contracts is applied to agricultural insurance to show that, given full infor...
This paper examines the potential for adverse selection when farmers are offered a portfolio of insu...
This paper examines whether the loadings on the crop insurance premium rates for risks such as moral...
The asymmetric information problems of adverse selection and moral hazardcan cause insurance markets...
The main motivation for this paper is the recognition of the fact that asymmetric information is the...
Adverse selection is often blamed for crop insurance indemnities exceeding premiums plus subsidies. ...
By altering the probability distribution of farm income, crop insurance programs affect farmer's inp...
Adverse selection is often blamed for crop insurance indemnities exceeding premiums plus subsidies. ...
This research identifies two problems in the new Federal Crop Insurance that may cause adverse selec...
Crop insurance is a frequent topic of debate among policymakers. This dissertation answers questions...
Developing new risk management products for all agricultural commodities has increased in importance...
Fundamentally, risk management on a farm is aimed at smoothing out the income or profit stream over ...
We use a large increase in Federal crop insurance subsidies as a natural experiment to identify the ...
The U.S. crop insurance market has several features that set it apart from other insurance markets. ...
This study focuses on how subsidized crop insurance affects the farm portfolio. Crop insurance progr...
The economic theory of contracts is applied to agricultural insurance to show that, given full infor...
This paper examines the potential for adverse selection when farmers are offered a portfolio of insu...
This paper examines whether the loadings on the crop insurance premium rates for risks such as moral...
The asymmetric information problems of adverse selection and moral hazardcan cause insurance markets...
The main motivation for this paper is the recognition of the fact that asymmetric information is the...
Adverse selection is often blamed for crop insurance indemnities exceeding premiums plus subsidies. ...
By altering the probability distribution of farm income, crop insurance programs affect farmer's inp...
Adverse selection is often blamed for crop insurance indemnities exceeding premiums plus subsidies. ...
This research identifies two problems in the new Federal Crop Insurance that may cause adverse selec...
Crop insurance is a frequent topic of debate among policymakers. This dissertation answers questions...
Developing new risk management products for all agricultural commodities has increased in importance...
Fundamentally, risk management on a farm is aimed at smoothing out the income or profit stream over ...
We use a large increase in Federal crop insurance subsidies as a natural experiment to identify the ...
The U.S. crop insurance market has several features that set it apart from other insurance markets. ...
This study focuses on how subsidized crop insurance affects the farm portfolio. Crop insurance progr...
The economic theory of contracts is applied to agricultural insurance to show that, given full infor...