We test if cooperation is promoted by rank-order competition between groups in which all groups can be ranked first, i.e. when everyone can be a winner. This type of rank-order competition has the advantage that it can eliminate the negative externality a group's performance imposes on other groups. However, it has the disadvantage that incentives to outperform others are absent, and therefore it does not eliminate equilibria where all groups cooperate at an equal but low level. We find that all-can-win competition produces a universal increase in cooperation and benefits a majority of individuals if the incentive to compete is sharp.Intergroup competition Cooperation Public goods Experiment
<div><p>Identifying methods to increase cooperation and efficiency in public goods provision is of v...
When groups compete for resources, some groups will be more successful than others, forcing out less...
The benefit mutually gained by cooperators is considered the ultimate explanation for why cooperatio...
In this paper, we study the effectiveness of intergroup competition in promoting cooperative behavio...
We study a class of multi-level collective actions, in which each individual is simultaneously engag...
We report the results of a new public goods experiment with an intra-group cooperation dilemma and i...
Olson’s analysis argues that the free-rider problem makes large groups less effective. In this paper...
We report an experiment on the effect of intergroup competition on group coordination in the minimal...
Abstract. Our experiment is made by three treatments. The first one reproduces the classical public ...
This is an electronic copy of an article; from the Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. Copy...
Identifying methods to increase cooperation and efficiency in public goods provision is of vital int...
In this paper we show experimentally that conditional cooperation, a phenomenon described in the pri...
When groups compete for resources, some groups will be more successful than others, forcing out less...
We examine the equilibrium effort levels of individual players and groups in contests in which n gro...
When groups compete for resources, some groups will be more successful than others, forcing out less...
<div><p>Identifying methods to increase cooperation and efficiency in public goods provision is of v...
When groups compete for resources, some groups will be more successful than others, forcing out less...
The benefit mutually gained by cooperators is considered the ultimate explanation for why cooperatio...
In this paper, we study the effectiveness of intergroup competition in promoting cooperative behavio...
We study a class of multi-level collective actions, in which each individual is simultaneously engag...
We report the results of a new public goods experiment with an intra-group cooperation dilemma and i...
Olson’s analysis argues that the free-rider problem makes large groups less effective. In this paper...
We report an experiment on the effect of intergroup competition on group coordination in the minimal...
Abstract. Our experiment is made by three treatments. The first one reproduces the classical public ...
This is an electronic copy of an article; from the Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. Copy...
Identifying methods to increase cooperation and efficiency in public goods provision is of vital int...
In this paper we show experimentally that conditional cooperation, a phenomenon described in the pri...
When groups compete for resources, some groups will be more successful than others, forcing out less...
We examine the equilibrium effort levels of individual players and groups in contests in which n gro...
When groups compete for resources, some groups will be more successful than others, forcing out less...
<div><p>Identifying methods to increase cooperation and efficiency in public goods provision is of v...
When groups compete for resources, some groups will be more successful than others, forcing out less...
The benefit mutually gained by cooperators is considered the ultimate explanation for why cooperatio...