Add to ORKG"Selection in Dynamic Games" 1. Assortative Matching with costly search, presented by Alp Atakan 2. A Refinement of Sequential Equilibrium with Application to Decentralized Collusion, presented by Peter Eso 3. Noisy evolution in Normal form Games, presented by Christoph Kuzmics 4. The folk theorem for all games with almost perfect monitoring presented by Johannes Horner Abstract: We study repeated games in which monitoring is imperfect and private. We prove the folk theorem for all two-player (finite) games assuming that the monitoring is almost perfect, but not necessarily almost publicimperfect private monitoring, repeated games
The Folk Theorem for infinitely repeated games with imperfect public mon-itoring asserts that for a ...
Most theoretical or applied research on repeated games with imper-fect monitoring has restricted att...
In repeated games with imperfect public monitoring, players can use public signals to coordinate the...
The folk theorem of repeated games has established that cooperative behavior can be sustained as an ...
International audienceWe prove the folk theorem for discounted repeated games under private, almost-...
We adapt the methods from Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1990) to finitely repeated games with imperfe...
This paper investigates infinitely repeated prisoner-dilemma games, where the discount factor is les...
The present paper shows that the Folk Theorem under imperfect (public) information (Fudenberg, Levin...
It is shown that, for almost every two-player game with imperfect monitoring, the conclusions of the...
This paper investigates infinitely repeated prisoner-dilemma games where the discount factor is less...
This paper studies repeated games with private monitoring where players make optimal decisions with ...
1I am grateful to the associate editor, an anonymous referee, Galit Ashkenazi-Golan, Michihiro Kando...
Most theoretical or applied research on repeated games with imperfect monitoring has restricted atte...
In this paper, we prove that, under full rank, every perfect public equilibrium payoff (above some N...
This note presents three results on repeated games. First, players can be better off with imperfect ...
The Folk Theorem for infinitely repeated games with imperfect public mon-itoring asserts that for a ...
Most theoretical or applied research on repeated games with imper-fect monitoring has restricted att...
In repeated games with imperfect public monitoring, players can use public signals to coordinate the...
The folk theorem of repeated games has established that cooperative behavior can be sustained as an ...
International audienceWe prove the folk theorem for discounted repeated games under private, almost-...
We adapt the methods from Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1990) to finitely repeated games with imperfe...
This paper investigates infinitely repeated prisoner-dilemma games, where the discount factor is les...
The present paper shows that the Folk Theorem under imperfect (public) information (Fudenberg, Levin...
It is shown that, for almost every two-player game with imperfect monitoring, the conclusions of the...
This paper investigates infinitely repeated prisoner-dilemma games where the discount factor is less...
This paper studies repeated games with private monitoring where players make optimal decisions with ...
1I am grateful to the associate editor, an anonymous referee, Galit Ashkenazi-Golan, Michihiro Kando...
Most theoretical or applied research on repeated games with imperfect monitoring has restricted atte...
In this paper, we prove that, under full rank, every perfect public equilibrium payoff (above some N...
This note presents three results on repeated games. First, players can be better off with imperfect ...
The Folk Theorem for infinitely repeated games with imperfect public mon-itoring asserts that for a ...
Most theoretical or applied research on repeated games with imper-fect monitoring has restricted att...
In repeated games with imperfect public monitoring, players can use public signals to coordinate the...