In practice, two types of tournaments can be distinguished - U-type and J-type tournaments. In U-type tournaments, workers receive prizes that have been fixed in advance. In J-type tournaments, the employer fixes an aggregate wage bill in advance, which is then shared among the workers according to their relative performance. The results of the paper show that the outcomes of the two tournament types substantially differ. Especially, an employer will prefer J-type to U-type tournaments if the number of workers is large, whereas the opposite holds for small numbers of workers.collusion, human capital, relative deprivation, tournaments
Empirical studies have challenged tournament theory by pointing out that (1) there is considerable p...
Experimental economics is used to investigate two important hypotheses proposed in the economics lit...
We analyze the optimal combination of promotion tournaments and individual performance pay in an emp...
This paper discusses the properties of stylized U.S. ("U-type") and Japanese tournaments ("J-type"),...
We analyze the optimal design of rank-order tournaments with heterogeneous workers. Iftournament pri...
The existing literature on the comparison of tournaments and piece rates as alternative incentive sc...
Tournaments are commonly used in the workplace to determine promotion, assign bonuses, and motivate ...
In many facets of life, we often face competition with a multilayered structure in which different le...
This note describes the effects on human capital formation of rank-order tournaments offering ident...
Trial-based tournament is a widespread hiring mechanism in organizations. Upon a job opening, an app...
In many tournaments it is the contestants themselves who determine reward allocation. Labor-union me...
IZA Discussion paper n° 1983When exogenously imposed, rank-order tournaments have incentive properti...
Several empirical studies have challenged tournament theory by pointing out that (1) there is consid...
by Yau Oi-Man.Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1992.Includes bibliographical refer...
Standard models of promotion tournaments assume that firms can commit to arbitrary tournament prizes...
Empirical studies have challenged tournament theory by pointing out that (1) there is considerable p...
Experimental economics is used to investigate two important hypotheses proposed in the economics lit...
We analyze the optimal combination of promotion tournaments and individual performance pay in an emp...
This paper discusses the properties of stylized U.S. ("U-type") and Japanese tournaments ("J-type"),...
We analyze the optimal design of rank-order tournaments with heterogeneous workers. Iftournament pri...
The existing literature on the comparison of tournaments and piece rates as alternative incentive sc...
Tournaments are commonly used in the workplace to determine promotion, assign bonuses, and motivate ...
In many facets of life, we often face competition with a multilayered structure in which different le...
This note describes the effects on human capital formation of rank-order tournaments offering ident...
Trial-based tournament is a widespread hiring mechanism in organizations. Upon a job opening, an app...
In many tournaments it is the contestants themselves who determine reward allocation. Labor-union me...
IZA Discussion paper n° 1983When exogenously imposed, rank-order tournaments have incentive properti...
Several empirical studies have challenged tournament theory by pointing out that (1) there is consid...
by Yau Oi-Man.Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1992.Includes bibliographical refer...
Standard models of promotion tournaments assume that firms can commit to arbitrary tournament prizes...
Empirical studies have challenged tournament theory by pointing out that (1) there is considerable p...
Experimental economics is used to investigate two important hypotheses proposed in the economics lit...
We analyze the optimal combination of promotion tournaments and individual performance pay in an emp...