Una verifica empirica del ciclo elettorale nelle scelte di politica fiscale dei governi locali marchigiani - In this paper we conduct a dynamic panel data analysis using 246 municipalities of the Marche region in order to investigate the presence of electoral budget cycle in local tax setting. Results show that local governments significantly decrease property tax rate during the election year. Although incumbent politicians can choose the tax rate in a range from 4% to 7%, results highlight that the range is not a hindrance to engaging electoral competition at the local government level.
This thesis proposes three distinct contribution to the field of economic analysis on local governme...
This paper argues that electoral competition may hinder rather than foster political accountability,...
The abolition of the municipal property tax on owner-occupied dwellings accomplished in Italy in 200...
The introduction of a new real estate taxes in Italy in 2011 generated a natural experiment, which i...
Are the incentives to expand expenditure before local elections affected by the composition of local...
This paper uses Italian local government data to test for fiscal interaction arising from yardstick ...
Are the incentives to expand expenditure before local elections affected by the composition of local...
Are the incentives to expand expenditure before local elections affected by the composition of local...
We study the effect of introducing a less transparent tax tool for the financing of local government...
The aim of this paper is to conduct an empirical investigation regarding the presence of political a...
This paper assesses the extent to which property taxes are capitalized into property values, exploit...
The purpose of this paper is to assess whether politicians manipulate the timing of tax rate changes...
This paper investigates the determinants of tax setting by local governments in the case of a tax s...
The purpose of this paper is to assess whether politicians manipulate the timing of tax rate changes...
Abstract Previous studies on electoral competition show that fiscal variables are manipulated by inc...
This thesis proposes three distinct contribution to the field of economic analysis on local governme...
This paper argues that electoral competition may hinder rather than foster political accountability,...
The abolition of the municipal property tax on owner-occupied dwellings accomplished in Italy in 200...
The introduction of a new real estate taxes in Italy in 2011 generated a natural experiment, which i...
Are the incentives to expand expenditure before local elections affected by the composition of local...
This paper uses Italian local government data to test for fiscal interaction arising from yardstick ...
Are the incentives to expand expenditure before local elections affected by the composition of local...
Are the incentives to expand expenditure before local elections affected by the composition of local...
We study the effect of introducing a less transparent tax tool for the financing of local government...
The aim of this paper is to conduct an empirical investigation regarding the presence of political a...
This paper assesses the extent to which property taxes are capitalized into property values, exploit...
The purpose of this paper is to assess whether politicians manipulate the timing of tax rate changes...
This paper investigates the determinants of tax setting by local governments in the case of a tax s...
The purpose of this paper is to assess whether politicians manipulate the timing of tax rate changes...
Abstract Previous studies on electoral competition show that fiscal variables are manipulated by inc...
This thesis proposes three distinct contribution to the field of economic analysis on local governme...
This paper argues that electoral competition may hinder rather than foster political accountability,...
The abolition of the municipal property tax on owner-occupied dwellings accomplished in Italy in 200...