Add to ORKGIf the equilibrium generated by a matching mechanism is to be the desired Pareto optimal outcome, it is necessary for every player to be at an interior solution at that equilibrium. Using the aggregative game approach developed by Cornes and Hartley (2003, 2007), this paper analyzes the conditions under which matching mechanisms in a public good economy lead to interior matching equilibria at which all agents make strictly positive flat contributions to the public good. In particular, we show that the distribution of income among the agents is crucial for both the existence of interior matching equilibria and Warr neutrality in the case of matching.Aggregative games Matching mechanisms Public goods Warr neutrality
We consider pure exchange economies with finitely many private goods including also non- Samuelsonia...
This dissertation examines the Nash equilibrium in giving by private individuals when the gifts are ...
Matching mechanisms are regarded as an important instrument to bring about Pareto optimal allocation...
If the equilibrium generated by a matching mechanism is to be the desired Pareto optimal outcome, it...
Using the aggregative game approach as developed by Cornes and Hartley (2003, 2007) this paper analy...
We exploit the aggregative structure of the public good model to provide a simple analysis of the vo...
In many empirically relevant situations agents in different groups are affected by the provision of ...
Existence and warr neutrality for matching equilibria in a public good economy: an aggregative game ...
This thesis studies equilibrium problems in aggregative games. A game describes the interaction amon...
This paper links coalition theory with matching mechanisms in the presence of global public goods am...
Collective action problems arise in a variety of situations. The economic theory of public good prov...
In our previous paper, "Optimal Allocation of Public Goods...," (1977) we presented a mechanism for ...
Inefficiencies in private giving are a common occurrence in public good games. In this dissertation,...
In this paper we introduce a new approach to representing both TU-games and NTU-games as special eco...
The strategic analysis of the private provision of a discrete public good has shown the existence of...
We consider pure exchange economies with finitely many private goods including also non- Samuelsonia...
This dissertation examines the Nash equilibrium in giving by private individuals when the gifts are ...
Matching mechanisms are regarded as an important instrument to bring about Pareto optimal allocation...
If the equilibrium generated by a matching mechanism is to be the desired Pareto optimal outcome, it...
Using the aggregative game approach as developed by Cornes and Hartley (2003, 2007) this paper analy...
We exploit the aggregative structure of the public good model to provide a simple analysis of the vo...
In many empirically relevant situations agents in different groups are affected by the provision of ...
Existence and warr neutrality for matching equilibria in a public good economy: an aggregative game ...
This thesis studies equilibrium problems in aggregative games. A game describes the interaction amon...
This paper links coalition theory with matching mechanisms in the presence of global public goods am...
Collective action problems arise in a variety of situations. The economic theory of public good prov...
In our previous paper, "Optimal Allocation of Public Goods...," (1977) we presented a mechanism for ...
Inefficiencies in private giving are a common occurrence in public good games. In this dissertation,...
In this paper we introduce a new approach to representing both TU-games and NTU-games as special eco...
The strategic analysis of the private provision of a discrete public good has shown the existence of...
We consider pure exchange economies with finitely many private goods including also non- Samuelsonia...
This dissertation examines the Nash equilibrium in giving by private individuals when the gifts are ...
Matching mechanisms are regarded as an important instrument to bring about Pareto optimal allocation...