Do shareholders really own the firm?

The object of this contribution is to address the question of the ownership of the firm. Both law and economics shape representations of the world: law focuses on rules and justice; economics focuses on efficiency and allocation. They describe common situations and "objects'' such as firms and their functioning, both with positive (analytical) and normative perspectives. However, their descriptions and remedies for the issues which they tackle are very different due to the differences in their philosophical and sociological goals. The Law & Economics perspective can be described as the use of the economics theoretical framework upon issues of law. In this perspective, law issues are addressed as any other economic phenomenon through the prism of efficiency. From this perspective, law is contingent upon normative conditions of economic theory and the best solution arises after a standard process of optimisation. This paper will set out a reversal of that epistemological position: instead of using economic representations to improve the state of law, representations of law will be aimed at testing and improving the economic analytical framework. Since corporate governance issues are structured by domestic laws as well as by economic regulations, legal representations will be discussed in light of economic corporate governance analysis.corporate governance, agency theory, law & economics, property rights, stakeholder approach.