Add to ORKGWe show that the principal result of Aghion and Bolton (1992) related to the optimality properties of contingent control allocations under incomplete contracting environment holds only if an additional condition is satisfied.
The government and a non-governmental organization (NGO) can invest in the provision of a public goo...
Cataloged from PDF version of article.We consider a dynamic trade relationship where quality is not ...
We propose a model of equilibrium contracting between two agents who are “boundedly rational” in the...
We analyze incomplete long-term financial contracts between an entrepreneur with no initial wealth a...
This thesis consists of an introductory chapter and four essays on financial contracting theory. In ...
In a property-rights framework, I study how organizational form and quantity contracts interact in g...
The authors analyze incomplete long-term financial contracts between an entrepreneur with no initial...
We study whether a firm that produces and sells access to an excludable public good should face a se...
The paper stresses - in sharp contrast with the main contributions in the relevant literature on inc...
This paper contributes to the literature on the foundations of incomplete contracts. In a holdup fra...
The dissertation explores the effect of limited contractual commitment on the form of contracts and ...
This paper examines how the model of De Fraja [Games and Economic Behavior, 1999] can be amended aft...
We propose a model of equilibrium contracting between two agents who are "boundedly rational" in the...
This paper considers the role that contract doctrine should play in facilitating optimal investment ...
We analyze the problem of a buyer who purchases a long-term project from one of several suppliers. A...
The government and a non-governmental organization (NGO) can invest in the provision of a public goo...
Cataloged from PDF version of article.We consider a dynamic trade relationship where quality is not ...
We propose a model of equilibrium contracting between two agents who are “boundedly rational” in the...
We analyze incomplete long-term financial contracts between an entrepreneur with no initial wealth a...
This thesis consists of an introductory chapter and four essays on financial contracting theory. In ...
In a property-rights framework, I study how organizational form and quantity contracts interact in g...
The authors analyze incomplete long-term financial contracts between an entrepreneur with no initial...
We study whether a firm that produces and sells access to an excludable public good should face a se...
The paper stresses - in sharp contrast with the main contributions in the relevant literature on inc...
This paper contributes to the literature on the foundations of incomplete contracts. In a holdup fra...
The dissertation explores the effect of limited contractual commitment on the form of contracts and ...
This paper examines how the model of De Fraja [Games and Economic Behavior, 1999] can be amended aft...
We propose a model of equilibrium contracting between two agents who are "boundedly rational" in the...
This paper considers the role that contract doctrine should play in facilitating optimal investment ...
We analyze the problem of a buyer who purchases a long-term project from one of several suppliers. A...
The government and a non-governmental organization (NGO) can invest in the provision of a public goo...
Cataloged from PDF version of article.We consider a dynamic trade relationship where quality is not ...
We propose a model of equilibrium contracting between two agents who are “boundedly rational” in the...