I present a tractable dynamic model of political economy where disagreements about the composition of public spending result in implementation of short-sighted policies. Excessive taxation reduces the return to physical capital and hence investment rates, which slows down growth along the transition. In the long run, output, consumption and welfare are inefficiently low. The larger is the degree of polarization, the greater is the inefficiency. Political stability mitigates the effects of polarization by making the incumbent internalize the dynamic inefficiencies introduced by the choice of growth-retarding policies. JEL: D72, E22, E23, E62, H25, O16, O17
Growth-rate volatility is a vital topic for students of comparative and international political econ...
We examine the role of politico-economic influences on macroeconomic performance within the framewor...
This paper studies the government’s public investment decision problem. Above some critical value o...
I present a tractable dynamic model of political economy where disagreements about the composition o...
Two parties have different goals. Voters, but not parties, are uncertain about the functioning of th...
We consider a simple political-economic model where capitalist investment is constrained by the gove...
This study develops an eondogenous growth model that depicts the process of economic development, su...
We are motivated by four stylized facts computed for emerging and developed economies: (i) business ...
Two parties have different goals. Voters, but not parties, are uncertain about the functioning of th...
When the government must decide not only on road public-policy programs (like investment in infrastr...
In this paper, we address two questions: (i) Why do developing countries with the highest growth rat...
We set out an infinite-horizon political economy model with partisan and office motivation effects i...
When the government must decide not only on broad public-policy programs but also on the provision o...
In the early 1990s, hardly anyone – at least outside the shrunken socialist circles – would have dou...
We consider a political economy model of country whose citizens have heterogeneous preferences for a...
Growth-rate volatility is a vital topic for students of comparative and international political econ...
We examine the role of politico-economic influences on macroeconomic performance within the framewor...
This paper studies the government’s public investment decision problem. Above some critical value o...
I present a tractable dynamic model of political economy where disagreements about the composition o...
Two parties have different goals. Voters, but not parties, are uncertain about the functioning of th...
We consider a simple political-economic model where capitalist investment is constrained by the gove...
This study develops an eondogenous growth model that depicts the process of economic development, su...
We are motivated by four stylized facts computed for emerging and developed economies: (i) business ...
Two parties have different goals. Voters, but not parties, are uncertain about the functioning of th...
When the government must decide not only on road public-policy programs (like investment in infrastr...
In this paper, we address two questions: (i) Why do developing countries with the highest growth rat...
We set out an infinite-horizon political economy model with partisan and office motivation effects i...
When the government must decide not only on broad public-policy programs but also on the provision o...
In the early 1990s, hardly anyone – at least outside the shrunken socialist circles – would have dou...
We consider a political economy model of country whose citizens have heterogeneous preferences for a...
Growth-rate volatility is a vital topic for students of comparative and international political econ...
We examine the role of politico-economic influences on macroeconomic performance within the framewor...
This paper studies the government’s public investment decision problem. Above some critical value o...