We calculate learning rates when agents are informed through public and private observation of other agents' actions. We characterize the evolution of the distribution of posterior beliefs. If the private learning channel is present, convergence of the distribution of beliefs to the perfect-information limit is exponential at a rate equal to the sum of the mean arrival rate of public information and the mean rate at which individual agents are randomly matched with other agents. If, however, there is no private information sharing, then convergence is exponential at a rate strictly lower than the mean arrival rate of public information.Information percolation Search Learning rates
We develop a model of information exchange through communication and inves-tigate its implications f...
This paper reports on an experimental study of the way in which individuals make inferences from pub...
We study a simple dynamic model of social learning with local informational externalities. There is ...
We calculate learning rates when agents are informed through both public and private observation of...
We study how a continuum of agents learn about disseminated information by observing others’ actions...
We study the diffusion of dispersed private information in a large economy. We assume that agents le...
We consider social learning settings in which a group of agents face uncertainty regarding a state o...
Short-lived agents want to predict a random variable $\theta $ and have to decide how much effort to...
We study how effectively a group of rational agents learns from repeatedly observing each others' ac...
e study the rate of convergence of Bayesian learning in social networks. Each individual receives a ...
This work studies the learning abilities of agents sharing partial beliefs over social networks. The...
A number of experimental studies have found that pari-mutuel markets possess the ability to aggregat...
A number of experimental studies have found that pari-mutuel markets possess the ability to aggregat...
We provide a model to investigate the tension between information aggregation and spread of misinfor...
We introduce a simple model of the “percolation ” of information of common interest through a large ...
We develop a model of information exchange through communication and inves-tigate its implications f...
This paper reports on an experimental study of the way in which individuals make inferences from pub...
We study a simple dynamic model of social learning with local informational externalities. There is ...
We calculate learning rates when agents are informed through both public and private observation of...
We study how a continuum of agents learn about disseminated information by observing others’ actions...
We study the diffusion of dispersed private information in a large economy. We assume that agents le...
We consider social learning settings in which a group of agents face uncertainty regarding a state o...
Short-lived agents want to predict a random variable $\theta $ and have to decide how much effort to...
We study how effectively a group of rational agents learns from repeatedly observing each others' ac...
e study the rate of convergence of Bayesian learning in social networks. Each individual receives a ...
This work studies the learning abilities of agents sharing partial beliefs over social networks. The...
A number of experimental studies have found that pari-mutuel markets possess the ability to aggregat...
A number of experimental studies have found that pari-mutuel markets possess the ability to aggregat...
We provide a model to investigate the tension between information aggregation and spread of misinfor...
We introduce a simple model of the “percolation ” of information of common interest through a large ...
We develop a model of information exchange through communication and inves-tigate its implications f...
This paper reports on an experimental study of the way in which individuals make inferences from pub...
We study a simple dynamic model of social learning with local informational externalities. There is ...