Add to ORKGA Nash equilibrium x of a normal-form game G is essential if any perturbation of G has an equilibrium close to x. Using payoff perturbations, we show that for games that are generic in the set of compact, quasiconcave, and generalized payoff secure games with upper semicontinuous sum of payoffs, all equilibria are essential. Some variants of this result are also established.Infinite normal-form game Equilibrium refinement Essential equilibrium Payoff security
We apply Mertens' dedinition of stability for a game in strategic form to a game in extensive form w...
Since some Nash equilibria can be considered as irrational, we are interested here in refinements of...
We introduce a relaxed Nash equilibrium concept for strategic form games, called emph{quasi-Nash equ...
AbstractIn this note, we prove the existence of Nash equilibria in infinite normal form games with c...
In this note, we prove the existence of Nash equilibria in infinite normal form games with compact s...
We present a general existence result for a type of equilibrium in normal-form games, which extends ...
We introduce a notion of upper semicontinuity, weak upper semicontinuity, and show that it, together...
We address the essential stability of Cournot-Nash equilibria for generalized games with a continuum...
We characterize essential stability of Cournot-Nash equilibria of generalized games with a continuu...
We characterize essential stability of Cournot-Nash equilibria for generalized games with a continuu...
Abstract: An alternative definition of regular equilibria is introduced and shown to have the same p...
Abstract. This paper examines the question of the extent to which it is true that any equilibrium th...
We study whether we can weaken the conditions given in Reny [4] and still obtain existence of pure s...
We study whether we can weaken the conditions given in Reny [4] and still obtain existence of pure s...
By constructing a corresponding Nash map, we prove that every infinite game with compact metrizable ...
We apply Mertens' dedinition of stability for a game in strategic form to a game in extensive form w...
Since some Nash equilibria can be considered as irrational, we are interested here in refinements of...
We introduce a relaxed Nash equilibrium concept for strategic form games, called emph{quasi-Nash equ...
AbstractIn this note, we prove the existence of Nash equilibria in infinite normal form games with c...
In this note, we prove the existence of Nash equilibria in infinite normal form games with compact s...
We present a general existence result for a type of equilibrium in normal-form games, which extends ...
We introduce a notion of upper semicontinuity, weak upper semicontinuity, and show that it, together...
We address the essential stability of Cournot-Nash equilibria for generalized games with a continuum...
We characterize essential stability of Cournot-Nash equilibria of generalized games with a continuu...
We characterize essential stability of Cournot-Nash equilibria for generalized games with a continuu...
Abstract: An alternative definition of regular equilibria is introduced and shown to have the same p...
Abstract. This paper examines the question of the extent to which it is true that any equilibrium th...
We study whether we can weaken the conditions given in Reny [4] and still obtain existence of pure s...
We study whether we can weaken the conditions given in Reny [4] and still obtain existence of pure s...
By constructing a corresponding Nash map, we prove that every infinite game with compact metrizable ...
We apply Mertens' dedinition of stability for a game in strategic form to a game in extensive form w...
Since some Nash equilibria can be considered as irrational, we are interested here in refinements of...
We introduce a relaxed Nash equilibrium concept for strategic form games, called emph{quasi-Nash equ...