Self-composition is a logical formulation of non-interference, a high-level security property that guarantees the absence of illicit information leakages through executing programs. In order to capture program executions, self-composition has been expressed in Hoare or modal logic, and has been proved (or refuted) by using theorem provers. These approaches require considerable user interaction, and verification expertise. This paper presents an automated technique to prove self-composition. We reformulate the idea of self-composition into comparing pairs of symbolic paths of the same program; the symbolic paths are given by Symbolic Execution. The result of our analysis is a logical formula expressing self-composition in first-order theori...
To achieve end-to-end security in a system built from parts, it is important to ensure that the comp...
Formal verification of cryptographic software implementations poses significant chal-lenges for off-...
Abstract. We discuss how to perform symbolic execution of large programs in a manner that is both co...
This work is licensed under a CC-BY Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported license (http://creati...
Information flow policies are confidentiality policies that control information leakage through prog...
Formal verification of cryptographic software implementations poses significant challenges for off-t...
When giving a program access to secret information, one must ensure that the program does not le...
This paper shows how secure information flow properties of multi-threaded programs can be verified b...
Abstract. This paper shows how secure information flow properties of multi-threaded programs can be ...
Formal verification of cryptographic software implementations poses significant challenges for off-t...
Methods for proving that concurrent software does not leak its secrets has remained an active topic ...
We perform a formal analysis of compositionality techniques for proving possibilistic noninterferenc...
Research in information-flow security aims at developing methods to identify undesired information l...
Symbolic execution is a powerful, systematic program analysis approach that has received much visibi...
We perform a formal analysis of compositionality techniques for proving possibilistic noninterferenc...
To achieve end-to-end security in a system built from parts, it is important to ensure that the comp...
Formal verification of cryptographic software implementations poses significant chal-lenges for off-...
Abstract. We discuss how to perform symbolic execution of large programs in a manner that is both co...
This work is licensed under a CC-BY Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported license (http://creati...
Information flow policies are confidentiality policies that control information leakage through prog...
Formal verification of cryptographic software implementations poses significant challenges for off-t...
When giving a program access to secret information, one must ensure that the program does not le...
This paper shows how secure information flow properties of multi-threaded programs can be verified b...
Abstract. This paper shows how secure information flow properties of multi-threaded programs can be ...
Formal verification of cryptographic software implementations poses significant challenges for off-t...
Methods for proving that concurrent software does not leak its secrets has remained an active topic ...
We perform a formal analysis of compositionality techniques for proving possibilistic noninterferenc...
Research in information-flow security aims at developing methods to identify undesired information l...
Symbolic execution is a powerful, systematic program analysis approach that has received much visibi...
We perform a formal analysis of compositionality techniques for proving possibilistic noninterferenc...
To achieve end-to-end security in a system built from parts, it is important to ensure that the comp...
Formal verification of cryptographic software implementations poses significant chal-lenges for off-...
Abstract. We discuss how to perform symbolic execution of large programs in a manner that is both co...