We study the scheduling problem on unrelated machines in the mechanism design setting. This problem was proposed and studied in the seminal paper (Nisan and Ronen 1999), where they gave a $1.75$-approximation randomized truthful mechanism for the case of two machines. We improve this result by a $1.6737$-approximation randomized truthful mechanism. We also generalize our result to a $0.8368m$-approximation mechanism for task scheduling with $m$ machines, which improve the previous best upper bound of $0.875m( Mu\u27alem and Schapira 2007
We present and discuss general techniques for proving inapproximability results for truthful mecha-n...
We study the online version of the scheduling problem View the MathML source involving selfish agent...
AbstractWe study the problem of designing truthful algorithms for scheduling a set of tasks, each on...
AbstractIn this paper, we consider a restricted variant of the scheduling problem, where the machine...
AbstractIn this paper, we consider a restricted variant of the scheduling problem, where the machine...
We consider randomized mechanisms for multi-dimensional scheduling. Following Lavi and Swamy [10], w...
We consider randomized mechanisms for multi-dimensional scheduling. Following Lavi and Swamy [10], w...
We consider randomized mechanisms for multi-dimensional scheduling. Following Lavi and Swamy [10], w...
We consider randomized mechanisms for multi-dimensional scheduling. Following Lavi and Swamy [10], w...
International audienceWe consider the problem of designing truthful mechanisms for scheduling n task...
We consider the problem of designing truthful mechanisms on m unrelated machines, to minimize some o...
The Nisan-Ronen conjecture states that no truthful mechanism for makespan-minimization when allocati...
We study the problem of scheduling m tasks to n selfish, unrelated machines in order to minimize the...
International audienceWe study the problem of designing truthful algorithms for scheduling a set of ...
We study the problem of scheduling m tasks to n selfish, unrelated machines in order to minimize the...
We present and discuss general techniques for proving inapproximability results for truthful mecha-n...
We study the online version of the scheduling problem View the MathML source involving selfish agent...
AbstractWe study the problem of designing truthful algorithms for scheduling a set of tasks, each on...
AbstractIn this paper, we consider a restricted variant of the scheduling problem, where the machine...
AbstractIn this paper, we consider a restricted variant of the scheduling problem, where the machine...
We consider randomized mechanisms for multi-dimensional scheduling. Following Lavi and Swamy [10], w...
We consider randomized mechanisms for multi-dimensional scheduling. Following Lavi and Swamy [10], w...
We consider randomized mechanisms for multi-dimensional scheduling. Following Lavi and Swamy [10], w...
We consider randomized mechanisms for multi-dimensional scheduling. Following Lavi and Swamy [10], w...
International audienceWe consider the problem of designing truthful mechanisms for scheduling n task...
We consider the problem of designing truthful mechanisms on m unrelated machines, to minimize some o...
The Nisan-Ronen conjecture states that no truthful mechanism for makespan-minimization when allocati...
We study the problem of scheduling m tasks to n selfish, unrelated machines in order to minimize the...
International audienceWe study the problem of designing truthful algorithms for scheduling a set of ...
We study the problem of scheduling m tasks to n selfish, unrelated machines in order to minimize the...
We present and discuss general techniques for proving inapproximability results for truthful mecha-n...
We study the online version of the scheduling problem View the MathML source involving selfish agent...
AbstractWe study the problem of designing truthful algorithms for scheduling a set of tasks, each on...