This paper examines the impact of CEO IPO option grants on IPO underpricing. Contrary to Lowry and Murphy (2007) who do not find a relationship between the two, this paper finds such a relationship when board independence, the power of the CEO and venture capitalists (VCs) are taken into account. The results are threefold. First, powerful CEOs are able to reap substantial gains from IPO options, to the detriment of the shareholders. Second, young, powerful VCs use IPO option grants to bribe the CEO to agree to an early IPO which will leave more of the existing shareholders' money on the table. Finally, IPO options only work as a value-enhancing incentive in the presence of strong boards.Stock options Board independence Venture capital invol...
In the first chapter, using a dynamic agency model, I examine the allocation of control rights betwe...
We investigate empirically whether mispricing of a firm\u27s stock affects CEO equity-based compensa...
Going public often creates an agency conflict between the owner-manager and minority shareholders. O...
This paper examines the impact of CEO IPO option grants on IPO underpricing. Contrary to Lowry and M...
This paper examines the conditions under which CEOs are able to affect the timing and the price of t...
This paper shows that in large U.S. companies, founder-CEO and founder-family controlled firms exper...
Preliminary, please do not cite or distribute without permission.We examine the effect of investment...
This paper examines the development of effective boards in venture capital (VC)-backed initial publi...
There are many reasons why managers are interested in maintaining control over their firm. Some pote...
Combining a behavioral agency perspective with research on multiple-agency conflicts, this article e...
This paper studies the impact of five dimensions of venture capitalist (VC) power on the likelihood ...
Corporate governance research often focuses on two theoretical stands, agency theory and resource de...
This study examines differences between venture-backed and non venture-backed IPO firms in three asp...
Their interests tend to diverge in the later stages, write Haemin Dennis Park and Daniel Tzabba
In this paper, I examine the effect of venture capital ownership on IPO underpricing in the U.S. bet...
In the first chapter, using a dynamic agency model, I examine the allocation of control rights betwe...
We investigate empirically whether mispricing of a firm\u27s stock affects CEO equity-based compensa...
Going public often creates an agency conflict between the owner-manager and minority shareholders. O...
This paper examines the impact of CEO IPO option grants on IPO underpricing. Contrary to Lowry and M...
This paper examines the conditions under which CEOs are able to affect the timing and the price of t...
This paper shows that in large U.S. companies, founder-CEO and founder-family controlled firms exper...
Preliminary, please do not cite or distribute without permission.We examine the effect of investment...
This paper examines the development of effective boards in venture capital (VC)-backed initial publi...
There are many reasons why managers are interested in maintaining control over their firm. Some pote...
Combining a behavioral agency perspective with research on multiple-agency conflicts, this article e...
This paper studies the impact of five dimensions of venture capitalist (VC) power on the likelihood ...
Corporate governance research often focuses on two theoretical stands, agency theory and resource de...
This study examines differences between venture-backed and non venture-backed IPO firms in three asp...
Their interests tend to diverge in the later stages, write Haemin Dennis Park and Daniel Tzabba
In this paper, I examine the effect of venture capital ownership on IPO underpricing in the U.S. bet...
In the first chapter, using a dynamic agency model, I examine the allocation of control rights betwe...
We investigate empirically whether mispricing of a firm\u27s stock affects CEO equity-based compensa...
Going public often creates an agency conflict between the owner-manager and minority shareholders. O...
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