Add to ORKGIn this paper, the authors analyze optimal financial structure for an incumbent and potential entrant accounting for feedback effects in secondary asset markets.Financial Flexibility; Market Entry; Acquisition; Exit Values; Predation; Financial Contracting; Product Market Competition
Huberts NFD, Dawid H, Huisman K, Kort PM. Entry Deterrence by Timing Rather than Overinvestment in a...
In a dynamic model of optimal security design, we show when firms should preserve "equity capacity" ...
This paper analyzes the interaction between financial leverage and takeover activity. We develop a d...
We analyze optimal financial structure for an incumbent and potential entrant accounting for feedbac...
Cahier de Recherche du Groupe HEC Paris, n° 878/2007We analyze optimal financial structure for an in...
This article analyzes optimal financial contracts for an incumbent and potential entrant ac-counting...
We study a dynamic general equilibrium model in which firms choose their investment level and their ...
AbstractThe paper studies the incumbent-entrant problem in a fully dynamic setting. We find that und...
Previous literature presented a predation model based on agency problems in financial contracting. I...
This dissertation studies capital structure decisions of levered and unlevered firms using the model...
This paper studies the relationships among an incumbent firm’s optimal financial contract, corporate...
We provide a formal analysis of the notion that conglomerates are more ‘entrenched’ as they have ‘de...
We study a general equilibrium model in which firms choose their capital structure optimally, tradin...
We study a dynamic general equilibrium model in which firms choose their investment level and capita...
This paper shows that shareholders' option to renegotiate debt in a period of financial distress exa...
Huberts NFD, Dawid H, Huisman K, Kort PM. Entry Deterrence by Timing Rather than Overinvestment in a...
In a dynamic model of optimal security design, we show when firms should preserve "equity capacity" ...
This paper analyzes the interaction between financial leverage and takeover activity. We develop a d...
We analyze optimal financial structure for an incumbent and potential entrant accounting for feedbac...
Cahier de Recherche du Groupe HEC Paris, n° 878/2007We analyze optimal financial structure for an in...
This article analyzes optimal financial contracts for an incumbent and potential entrant ac-counting...
We study a dynamic general equilibrium model in which firms choose their investment level and their ...
AbstractThe paper studies the incumbent-entrant problem in a fully dynamic setting. We find that und...
Previous literature presented a predation model based on agency problems in financial contracting. I...
This dissertation studies capital structure decisions of levered and unlevered firms using the model...
This paper studies the relationships among an incumbent firm’s optimal financial contract, corporate...
We provide a formal analysis of the notion that conglomerates are more ‘entrenched’ as they have ‘de...
We study a general equilibrium model in which firms choose their capital structure optimally, tradin...
We study a dynamic general equilibrium model in which firms choose their investment level and capita...
This paper shows that shareholders' option to renegotiate debt in a period of financial distress exa...
Huberts NFD, Dawid H, Huisman K, Kort PM. Entry Deterrence by Timing Rather than Overinvestment in a...
In a dynamic model of optimal security design, we show when firms should preserve "equity capacity" ...
This paper analyzes the interaction between financial leverage and takeover activity. We develop a d...