Scholz offers a comment on Stephen Calkins\u27 article entitled Corporate Compliance and the Antitrust Agencies\u27 Bi-Modal Penalties. Scholz discusses deterrence theory and how the perspective on it changes
This thesis consists of three chapters on crime and enforcement. In the first chapter, we emphasize ...
Deterrence theory, rooted in the methodology of law and economics, continues to dominate both the th...
An extensive body of behavioural evidence suggests that our actions are not primarily steered by thr...
Calkins discusses individual compared with entity penalties as tools for encouraging corporate law c...
For many years, law and economics scholars, as well as politicians and regulators, have debated whet...
Allen comments on papers written by James Cox and Deborah DeMott regarding the deterrence of corpora...
Antitrust enforcement regimes rely on penalties against two groups of actors for deterrence: penalti...
This Chapter prepared for the Cambridge Handbook of Compliance reviews the key findings of the optim...
For many years, law and economics scholars, as well as politicians and regulators, have debated whet...
This article shows the limitations to the optimal deterrence-inspired cartel enforcement policy curr...
By combining approaches from the economic theory of crime and of industrial organization, this paper...
An extensive body of behavioural evidence suggests that our actions are not primarily steered by thr...
In recent years, enforcement officials have imposed billions of dollars in sanctions on all major U....
This article compares the criminal punishment of corporations in the twenty-first century with two a...
Cox discusses the linkage between private litigation and the deterrence of corporate misconduct
This thesis consists of three chapters on crime and enforcement. In the first chapter, we emphasize ...
Deterrence theory, rooted in the methodology of law and economics, continues to dominate both the th...
An extensive body of behavioural evidence suggests that our actions are not primarily steered by thr...
Calkins discusses individual compared with entity penalties as tools for encouraging corporate law c...
For many years, law and economics scholars, as well as politicians and regulators, have debated whet...
Allen comments on papers written by James Cox and Deborah DeMott regarding the deterrence of corpora...
Antitrust enforcement regimes rely on penalties against two groups of actors for deterrence: penalti...
This Chapter prepared for the Cambridge Handbook of Compliance reviews the key findings of the optim...
For many years, law and economics scholars, as well as politicians and regulators, have debated whet...
This article shows the limitations to the optimal deterrence-inspired cartel enforcement policy curr...
By combining approaches from the economic theory of crime and of industrial organization, this paper...
An extensive body of behavioural evidence suggests that our actions are not primarily steered by thr...
In recent years, enforcement officials have imposed billions of dollars in sanctions on all major U....
This article compares the criminal punishment of corporations in the twenty-first century with two a...
Cox discusses the linkage between private litigation and the deterrence of corporate misconduct
This thesis consists of three chapters on crime and enforcement. In the first chapter, we emphasize ...
Deterrence theory, rooted in the methodology of law and economics, continues to dominate both the th...
An extensive body of behavioural evidence suggests that our actions are not primarily steered by thr...
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