A Veto Player Theory of Policy Making in Semi-Presidential Regimes: The Case of Taiwan’s Ma Ying-jeou Presidency

[[abstract]]Extending the veto player theory to semi-presidential regimes, this paper illustrates the dynamics of policy making in Taiwan’s Ma Ying-jeou presidency. Semi-presidentialism is difficult to analyze in that the institutional veto players are usually vaguely defined, giving agenda-setters important roles to play. This paper shows that a veto player has the late-mover’s advantage if he is allowed to revise a proposal. That explains why policies involving lawmaking gives Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan considering bargaining power, even to the disadvantage of the president. The same logic implies that the president has a strong incentive to bypass the Legislative Yuan. The premier, encountering the president’s policy initiatives and the Legislative Yuan’s lawmaking power, is unlikely to be a dominant player. This paper exemplifies this dynamics by examining how the features of a policy affects its making in the first two years of Ma’s presidency.[[fileno]]2040629010001[[department]]社會學研究