Dirtying Aristotle\u27s Hands? Aristotle\u27s Analysis of \u27Mixed Acts\u27 in the \u3cem\u3eNicomachean Ethics\u3c/em\u3e III, 1

The analysis of \u27mixed acts\u27 in Nicomachean Ethics III, 1 has led scholars to attribute a theory of \u27dirty hands\u27 and \u27impossible oughts\u27 to Aristotle. Michael Stocker argues that Aristotle recognizes particular acts that are simultaneously \u27right, even obligatory\u27, but nevertheless \u27wrong, shameful and the like\u27. And Martha Nussbaum commends Aristotle for not sympathizing \u27with those who, in politics or in private affairs, would so shrink from blame and from unacceptable action that they would be unable to take a necessary decision for the best\u27. In this paper I reexamine Aristotle\u27s analysis of putatively \u27mixed acts\u27 in Nicomachean Ethics III, 1, maintaining that Aristotle denies that there are acts that are (i) voluntary under the circumstances, (ii) right, all things considered, under the circumstances, but nevertheless (iii) shameful or wrong for moral or prudential reasons under the circumstances. The paper defends this interpretation with reference to Aristotle\u27s discussion of shame in EN IV, 9 and Rhetoric II, 6, as well as his overall meta-ethical commitment to a position I call \u27mitigated circumstantial relativism\u27. By focusing on Aristotle\u27s analysis of putatively \u27mixed acts\u27, we come closer to a true appreciation of Aristotle\u27s ethical theory, even though \u27mixed act\u27 is not, I argue, a category in Aristotle\u27s considered ontology of action