Martha Nussbaum: Feminism between Universalism and Pluralism

This presentation is part of the Communities and Institutions: Negotiating Differences track. Martha Nussbaum describes the project of her book Women and Human Development as the ‘practical pursuit of gender justice’. Despite the emphasis on the practical, she believes that the feminist theory which underlies emancipation in the practical sense must have a firm philosophical basis. Philosophy, according to Nussbaum, is the best possible area in which to develop theories to think through issues having to do with gender justice. In sciences such as political science, legal theory or economics, theories are developed which have an impact on the lives of women, but it is philosophy which examines the presuppositions of such theories and the arguments used to support them. In this way, philosophy can make an important contribution to the emancipation of women. One of the issues which, according to Nussbaum, demonstrates the emancipatory potential of philosophy is the question of whether or not it is possible to apply universal values to the lives of women, regardless of where they live in the world. From one perspective, gender justice would seem to imply that women everywhere have the same rights. Nussbaum speaks of “universal values” which she sees realized in the ten capabilities which she formulates: the rights to life, to bodily health, to bodily integrity, the ability to use the senses, imagination and thought, the capacity to express emotions, the ability to use practical reason, having freedom of affiliation, being able to live in relation to other species, being able to play and having control over one’s environment. At the root of these capabilities lie the Aristotelian notion of being able to live a good life and the Kantian notion of the fundamental dignity of human beings. Nussbaum argues that all governments in the world should strive to enable their citizens to realize the capabilities. She also believes that institutions such as the U.N. and non-governmental organizations can make substantial contributions to this project. In this respect, Nussbaum’s philosophy is in line with efforts within international law to have governments sign declarations in which they promise to ensure fundamental rights for their citizens. From another perspective, gender justice would seem to imply that there is respect for cultural, legal and religious diversity in countries throughout the world. It would also seem to imply that women have the right to choose how to live their own lives. Part of such freedom of choice would be the capacity to refuse to implement some of the capabilities. Women could, for example, choose not to have the capability of freedom of affiliation (for example, being able to leave the home freely or having paid employment) or having control of their environment (for example, being able to own property). Nussbaum is acutely aware of the fact that any formulation of universal values could impinge on freedoms and could in fact constitute the paternalistic imposition of Western values on other countries. The issue of universalism versus pluralism is, however, a complex one. It illustrates the need for rigorous philosophical thought about what exactly is involved in the argumentation on both sides. In her book, Nussbaum raises a number of important issues. For example, she examines the image of third world cultures or of some religions as inherently repressive. She argues that this could be the result of a one-sided approach in which the repressive is emphasized over the emancipatory elements in the self-same tradition. She also examines the notion of women’s preferences, introducing the notion of informed versus uninformed or deformed preferences. While it would seem that preference based values are basic to human liberty, Nussbaum shows that not all the preferences which people have are informed, healthy, or good for them. Once people are educated as to the value of other preferences, they come to prefer those. Nussbaum thus examines the role which education can play in forming preferences. She also introduces the distinction between a capability as a basic human right and the freedom of people to choose whether or not to implement such a right. This distinction is important for the preservation of freedom over against a possible imposition of values. Interestingly, Nussbaum shows that the problem of imposing universal emancipatory values on a culture, the family, or religion is not just an issue in the relationship between Western countries and non-Western or third-world countries, but is also present in Western society. Governments regularly legislate ‘for the good of” their citizens, contrary to their preferences. Here too, the conflict between the imposition of values and individual liberty arises. A simple example of this is the question whether churches which receive tax exemptions have the right to ban women from ecclesiastical office. By raising the issue of what preferences and freedom entail and what the limitations are of the imposition of values on citizens, Nussbaum raises complex issues with respect to the notions of universalism and pluralism. Philosophy must rigorously examine the limitations of both. Nussbaum ultimately wishes to implement universal values in combination with respect for the particularity of individual human lives, cultures and religions. I wholeheartedly agree with Nussbaum on this point. I see no reason why women in some cultures, family situations or religions should have to suffer repression because of these contexts. At the same time, I see no reason why people should not be free to follow their own preferences, as long as they are informed preferences and alternatives are freely available. Yet, this combination of universalism and pluralism gives rise to a number of issues. I would like to raise a number of these points. Firstly, to what extent are the values which Nussbaum espouses grounded in Western philosophy and culture and to what extent are they founded on universal principles of reason and morality which will ultimately be recognized as evident by all people? Secondly, is it ultimately possible to combine universal norms with respect for the liberty of citizens and civil institutions? Or will the combination of universality and the pluralistic always be one of tension? Thirdly, what is the role of education in the process of recognizing universal values? Does education merely change one’s preferences or does it also change the values underlying the preferences and thus one’s cultural values? I will conclude that Nussbaum has convincingly shown that philosophical thought about the universality and the pluralism of values is of importance for the development of a practical strategy for the emancipation of women in all parts of the world