Prepared for presentation at the 2006 Shambaugh Conference, “Building Synergies: Institutions and Cooperation in World Politics,” October 12-14, 2006, University of Iowa. Abstract The negotiations of multilateral agreements are often long and laborious endeavors, but international relations scholars know very little about what occurs during the bargaining of such agreements, and systematic empirical work is seriously lacking. Little empirical work on how multilateral agreements are negotiated exists because data on the negotiations of a large number of agreements across multiple issue areas has not been collected. The purpose of this paper is to introduce a new database of facts related to the multilateral agreement making process. The dat...
Is it possible to design a bargaining institution that will substantially improve the international ...
The international relations literature currently lacks a systematic study of multilateral treaty rat...
People at home and trade negotiators in Geneva cannot bargain what they do not understand, and what ...
Abstract: The negotiations of multilateral agreements are often long and laborious endeavors, but in...
The management of a multilateral negotiation has frequently played a crucial role in developing glob...
In a single volume, a team of distinguished international scholars draws on a wide range of social s...
This paper analyzes how patterns of international cooperation are affected if a group of states, led...
Multilateral treaties' success depends in large part on decisions made during their drafting and neg...
When do states successfully form international agreements, and how are they designed? This dissertat...
It is commonly thought that there is a trade-off between the breadth and depth of multilateral insti...
In a single volume, a team of distinguished international scholars draws on a wide range of social s...
Who gets what in bargaining between states and international organizations (IOs)? Although distribut...
We describe a model of international, multidimensional policy coordination where countries can enter...
193 p.Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2005.This study expands our unders...
Why do some countries send big delegations to multilateral negotiations, whereas others send very s...
Is it possible to design a bargaining institution that will substantially improve the international ...
The international relations literature currently lacks a systematic study of multilateral treaty rat...
People at home and trade negotiators in Geneva cannot bargain what they do not understand, and what ...
Abstract: The negotiations of multilateral agreements are often long and laborious endeavors, but in...
The management of a multilateral negotiation has frequently played a crucial role in developing glob...
In a single volume, a team of distinguished international scholars draws on a wide range of social s...
This paper analyzes how patterns of international cooperation are affected if a group of states, led...
Multilateral treaties' success depends in large part on decisions made during their drafting and neg...
When do states successfully form international agreements, and how are they designed? This dissertat...
It is commonly thought that there is a trade-off between the breadth and depth of multilateral insti...
In a single volume, a team of distinguished international scholars draws on a wide range of social s...
Who gets what in bargaining between states and international organizations (IOs)? Although distribut...
We describe a model of international, multidimensional policy coordination where countries can enter...
193 p.Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2005.This study expands our unders...
Why do some countries send big delegations to multilateral negotiations, whereas others send very s...
Is it possible to design a bargaining institution that will substantially improve the international ...
The international relations literature currently lacks a systematic study of multilateral treaty rat...
People at home and trade negotiators in Geneva cannot bargain what they do not understand, and what ...