A critical appraisal of Byzantine military strategy, 400 - 1000 A.D.

Due to the character of the original source materials and the nature of batch digitization, quality control issues may be present in this document. Please report any quality issues you encounter to digital@library.tamu.edu, referencing the URI of the item.Includes bibliographical references: 68-74.Issued also on microfiche from Lange Micrographics.Byzantine military strategy has been a neglected subject within the discipline of military history. For many years, examination of the military writings and the abilities of Byzantine commanders has been hampered by the determination of earlier scholars that Byzantine generals relied more on deception and trickery than skill and planning to win battles. Because of these early statements, modern scholars have neglected to study the strategy and tactics embodied in the military treatises written after the fall of the western half of the Roman Empire. An in-depth study of these treatises, however, reveals that the Byzantines placed great emphasis on the preparation of the army for war, and on the tactics associated with battle. Byzantine military treatises, in fact, dwell far more on the preparation for and conduct of battle than they do on the use of stratagem. Deception and trickery, while not unknown to the Byzantine commander, were only tools that he might use to aid him in battle, rather than a crutch on which he was overly dependent. This thesis contradicts the findings of Edward Gibbon, George Finlay, Lynn Montross, and other scholars who demean the abilities of Byzantine tacticians and who relegate the victories of the Byzantine Army to the fruits of deception and deceit. This study of the extant military literature of the period demonstrates that the Byzantine military leaders were able strategists and tacticians and that stratagem was a minor component of the general's arsenal