The tools of genius: politics, supplies, and success in the British invasion of Palestine, 1916-1918

Due to the character of the original source materials and the nature of batch digitization, quality control issues may be present in this document. Please report any quality issues you encounter to digital@library.tamu.edu, referencing the URI of the item.Includes bibliographical references: p. 138-145.Issued also on microfiche from Lange Micrographics.Traditional evaluations of the British invasion of Palestine in the First World War suggest that British success against Turkey depended upon the personal abilities of a single man: General Sir Edmund Allenby. These studies hold that Allenby turned the strategies of his thick-witted predecessor General Sir Archibald Murray upside-down and substituted his own brilliant ideas about mobility and surprise, thus winning easily where a lesser man had lost. This standard view is misleading. An analysis of the politics and logistics of the campaign shows that success did not depend on the brilliance of any single person, but on the more practical factors of supply and reinforcement and on the political support in faraway capitals. In spring 1917, Murray lost the first two battles of Gaza because of a struggle between political factions in London. Quarrels among British politicians and generals about grand strategy caused Murray to be pressured into an unwise advance and then denied him the men and materials he needed. However, when Allenby took command of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force in summer 1917, Prime Minister David Lloyd George had just managed to make offensive action in Palestine a British war priority. Allenby enjoyed a wealth of manpower and supplies that allowed him to advance steadily for the rest of the war, while his beleaguered Turkish enemies were poorly equipped and outnumbered because their own government had lost interest in Palestine. Since Allenby's famous use of surprise and mobility depended upon his supplies and reinforcements for its success, the general must share his glory for the conquest of Turkish Palestine with the politicians who provided him with the materials for his victory