AID EFFECTIVENESS REASSESSED: AN INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH TO GENERAL BUDGET SUPPORT

La ricerca considera il problema dell'effettività dell'aiuto pubblico allo sviluppo secondo una prospettiva istituzionale. Nello specifico,la sostenibilità di accordi cooperativi tra donors and recipients viene considerata con riferimento a modelli istituzionali teorici. Il sistema di incentivi che determina la natura della relazione d'aiuto nel caso del General Budget Support è inoltre considerato con riferimento alla più recente prassi sviluppatasi in Tanzania.The researches considers that issues that are inherently connected with the type of donor-recipient relationship affect the productivity of aid. This is mainly because incentives embodied in the relation shape party behaviours. The basic elements that characterized the aid relationship and the incentives that aid organization face, are in fact altered according to the institutional set in which money flows. Different aid modalities bear in themselves the potential of acting on the aid relationship by changing the basic rules of the game. General Budget Support (GBS), as a new aid modality represents quite an interesting institution. Getting the “incentives” right for cooperation, in such a context, would imply a rethinking of the basic theoretical model and organizational features on the ground of the evolving practices and specific technology of provision. The research aim is opening a route of possible investigation into the dynamics of incentives related to international cooperation at country level. Tanzania has been chosen among a series of possible cases study as in the Sub Saharan Africa panorama it represents one of most successful cases of GBS implementation. The analysis is grounded on a general institutional analysis that puts at the centre of observation the structure of the negotiations between the group of donors and the recipient government. The framework employed represents an adaptation of the Institutional Analysis for Development. The purpose of understanding the set of explicit and hidden motivations is functional to better delineate the contractual set in which the bulk of relations takes place.Results obtained from the empirical analysis are considered in a theoretical fashion with the purpose of generalizing on the main structural change caused by GBS on the donor-recipient relation. Concepts are taken from NIE and organizational theory to study the governance structure of aid relations