The Role of Communal Intention in the Philosophies of Wilfrid Sellars and Richard Rorty

This thesis is primarily a descriptive exploration of the related moral philosophies of Wilfrid Sellars and Richard Rorty. While Rorty is clear that his normative thinking descends from Sellars\u27s positions, there are numerous differences between their two positions. For instance, though Rorty is a self-identified Sellarsian, he rejects the explicitly formal character of his predecessor\u27s work. Further, Sellars\u27s normative upshot may be seen as philanthropic whereas Rorty\u27s is best understood as solidaristic. Chapter 1 works through Sellars\u27s metaethical position, which gives an intentional account to experientially-imperative normative judgments. This description pays particular attention to the necessity of community and the action-motivating character of practical reasoning. Chapter 2 turns to Rorty\u27s deployment of Sellars\u27s insights, beginning with a brief account of the commonalities between their metaphysical and epistemological positions. The most significant extensions Rorty makes to Sellars\u27s position are in limiting justificatory schemas to only one\u27s own community and shifting the focus of this community from we reasoners to we sufferers. The third and final chapter briefly compliments one of the benefits of Rorty\u27s claims over Sellars\u27s before turning to critique, arguing that unfortunately neither of their positions have much in the way of content to offer. Beyond this, it seems difficult to understand trans-traditional conversation or deliberation on their accounts, especially Rorty\u27s. Nonetheless, by tracing the impact of Wilfrid Sellars\u27s thought in the work of Richard Rorty, an important connection may be made and explored