Scientists, Other Citizens, and the Art of Practical Reasoning

Inspired by the Arendtian distinction between the social and the political, this essay offers a critique of the tendency to frame the relationship between (scientific) expert knowledge and (political) democracy as a social issue or conflict between ‘ordinary citizens’ and ‘scientific experts’ as social groups. A tentative analysis explores the role of scientific expertise in democracies viewed as a practical issue in the classical, Aristotelian sense. It is suggested that the notions of praxis and practical reasoning as phronesis offer a framework that allows citizenship to scientists and might facilitate the integration of scientific knowledge into public deliberation on public affairs, but also would direct attention to the limitations of science.Inspired by the Arendtian distinction between the social and the political, this essay offers a critique of the tendency to frame the relationship between (scientific) expert knowledge and (political) democracy as a social issue or conflict between ‘ordinary citizens’ and ‘scientific experts’ as social groups. A tentative analysisexplores the role of scientific expertise in democracies viewed as a practical issue in the classical, Aristotelian sense. It is suggested that the notions of praxis and practical reasoning as phronesis offer a framework that allows citizenship to scientists and might facilitate the integration of scientific knowledge into public deliberation on public affairs, but also would direct attention to the limitations of science