Syria and the 1973 Arab-Israeli war

This chapter examines Syria’s role in the October 1973 fourth Arab-Israeli war. It first explores the causes of the war and of Syria’s involvement in it by sketching the historic regional context of the war, the domestic origins of the irredentism that drove Syrian behaviour, the structural precipitant, namely the outcome of the prior 1967 war, and the calculations and motives of the Arab leaders, particularly Hafiz al-Asad of Syria, who launched the war. It then examines the conduct of the war, including planning and execution and the outcome, notably a shift in the military balance that provoked diplomatic intervention by the United States. Finally, the consequences of the war are sketched. It analyses why the war led, not, as it might have, to a regional peace, but instead to a continuing chain of new wars; it also shows how the intractable conflict with Israel helped consolidate a national security state in Syria