Thomas Bradwardine's solution to the semantic paradoxes, presented in his Insolubilia written in Oxford in the early 1320s, turns on two main principles: that a proposition is true only if things are wholly as it signifies; and that signification is closed under consequence. After exploring the background in Walter Burley's account of the signification of propositions, I consider the extent to which Bradwardine's theory is compatible with the compositional principles of the distribution of truth over conjunction, disjunction, negation and the conditional
One of the main logical functions of the truth predicate is to enable us to express so-called `infi ...
The most exciting and innovative period in the discussion of the insolubles (i.e., logical paradoxes...
International audienceThis paper revisits Buridan's Bridge paradox (Sophismata, chapter 8, Sophism 1...
Ian Rumfitt has recently drawn our attention to a couple of paradoxes of signification, claiming tha...
In recent years, speech-act theory has mooted the possibility that one utterance can signify a numbe...
We can divide medieval discussions of the insolubles—logical paradoxes such as the Liar—into two mai...
In line with the Principle of Uniform Solution, Graham Priest has challenged advocates like myself o...
Some fourteenth‐century treatises on paradoxes of the liar family offer a promising starting‐point f...
In his article "Verdades antiguas y modernas" (in the same issue, pp. 207-27), David Miller criticis...
Bradwardine’s solution to the the logical paradoxes depends on the idea that every sentence signifie...
This paper presents and motivates a new philosophical and logical ap-proach to truth and semantic pa...
Abstract. Despite the volume of discussion on the Liar Paradox recently, there is one stream of larg...
This paper offers an analysis of a hitherto neglected text on insoluble propositions dating from the...
Fourteenth-century treatises on paradoxes of the liar family, especially Bradwardine's and Buridan's...
International audienceThe Liar Paradox challenges logicians’ and semanticists’ theories of truth and...
One of the main logical functions of the truth predicate is to enable us to express so-called `infi ...
The most exciting and innovative period in the discussion of the insolubles (i.e., logical paradoxes...
International audienceThis paper revisits Buridan's Bridge paradox (Sophismata, chapter 8, Sophism 1...
Ian Rumfitt has recently drawn our attention to a couple of paradoxes of signification, claiming tha...
In recent years, speech-act theory has mooted the possibility that one utterance can signify a numbe...
We can divide medieval discussions of the insolubles—logical paradoxes such as the Liar—into two mai...
In line with the Principle of Uniform Solution, Graham Priest has challenged advocates like myself o...
Some fourteenth‐century treatises on paradoxes of the liar family offer a promising starting‐point f...
In his article "Verdades antiguas y modernas" (in the same issue, pp. 207-27), David Miller criticis...
Bradwardine’s solution to the the logical paradoxes depends on the idea that every sentence signifie...
This paper presents and motivates a new philosophical and logical ap-proach to truth and semantic pa...
Abstract. Despite the volume of discussion on the Liar Paradox recently, there is one stream of larg...
This paper offers an analysis of a hitherto neglected text on insoluble propositions dating from the...
Fourteenth-century treatises on paradoxes of the liar family, especially Bradwardine's and Buridan's...
International audienceThe Liar Paradox challenges logicians’ and semanticists’ theories of truth and...
One of the main logical functions of the truth predicate is to enable us to express so-called `infi ...
The most exciting and innovative period in the discussion of the insolubles (i.e., logical paradoxes...
International audienceThis paper revisits Buridan's Bridge paradox (Sophismata, chapter 8, Sophism 1...