Many of the motivations in favor of contextualism about knowledge apply also to a contextualist approach to counterfactuals. I motivate and articulate such an approach, in terms of the context-sensitive 'all cases', in the spirit of David Lewis's contextualist view about knowledge. The resulting view explains intuitive data, resolves a puzzle parallel to the skeptical paradox, and renders safety and sensitivity, construed as counterfactuals, necessary conditions on knowledge.</p
In this paper I pair a contextualist theory of knowledge ascriptions with a non-contextual definitio...
§I schematizes the evidence for an understanding of 'know' and of other terms of epistemic appraisal...
The present paper defines two versions of contextualism about "know": "normal-indexical" contextuali...
Many of the motivations in favor of contextualism about knowledge apply also to a contextualist appr...
I defend a neo-Lewisean form of contextualism about knowledge attributions. Understanding the contex...
According to some powerful skeptical arguments, we know almost nothing. Contextualist theo...
Abstract. Counterfactual reasoning and contextuality is defined and critically evaluated with regard...
Philosophical skepticism seems often to undermine our knowledge to the point where we know next to n...
Due to the character of the original source materials and the nature of batch digitization, quality ...
Contextualist responses to skepticism about the external world are inadequate, and we should prefer ...
Contextualists maintain that the truth-values of knowledge attributions vary from conversational con...
I have argued for a kind of 'counterfactual scepticism': most counterfactuals ever uttered or though...
The central contentions of this paper are two:first, that contextualism about knowledge cannot fulfi...
According to David Lewis ’ contextualist analysis of knowledge, there can be contexts in which a sub...
In this paper we propose a new semantics, based on the notion of a "contextual model", that makes it...
In this paper I pair a contextualist theory of knowledge ascriptions with a non-contextual definitio...
§I schematizes the evidence for an understanding of 'know' and of other terms of epistemic appraisal...
The present paper defines two versions of contextualism about "know": "normal-indexical" contextuali...
Many of the motivations in favor of contextualism about knowledge apply also to a contextualist appr...
I defend a neo-Lewisean form of contextualism about knowledge attributions. Understanding the contex...
According to some powerful skeptical arguments, we know almost nothing. Contextualist theo...
Abstract. Counterfactual reasoning and contextuality is defined and critically evaluated with regard...
Philosophical skepticism seems often to undermine our knowledge to the point where we know next to n...
Due to the character of the original source materials and the nature of batch digitization, quality ...
Contextualist responses to skepticism about the external world are inadequate, and we should prefer ...
Contextualists maintain that the truth-values of knowledge attributions vary from conversational con...
I have argued for a kind of 'counterfactual scepticism': most counterfactuals ever uttered or though...
The central contentions of this paper are two:first, that contextualism about knowledge cannot fulfi...
According to David Lewis ’ contextualist analysis of knowledge, there can be contexts in which a sub...
In this paper we propose a new semantics, based on the notion of a "contextual model", that makes it...
In this paper I pair a contextualist theory of knowledge ascriptions with a non-contextual definitio...
§I schematizes the evidence for an understanding of 'know' and of other terms of epistemic appraisal...
The present paper defines two versions of contextualism about "know": "normal-indexical" contextuali...