We investigate how a change in regulatory oversight affects bank risk, using the passage of the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act of 2018 as a setting. Using a sample of bank holding companies (BHCs) covering the period 2015Q1 through 2020Q1, we find that risk increases for large BHCs affected by a change in regulatory oversight. In addition to increasing bank level risk, affected BHCs increase their respective contribution to the systemic risk. These BHCs also experience higher profitability, increased market valuation and reduced compliance costs
Regulation and corporate governance are able to influence the banks’ capital optimization problem, t...
Does a decrease in shareholder litigation enhance managers’ monitoring efforts by ensuring adequate ...
Does a decrease in shareholder litigation enhance managers’ monitoring efforts by ensuring adequate ...
We analyze bank governance, share ownership, CEO compensation, and bank risk taking in the period le...
The authors would like to thank the anonymous referee and Jim Peach of New Mexico State University f...
This paper examines the relation between securitization and bank risk of U.S. bank holding companies...
We find that shareholder-friendly corporate governance is associated with higher stand-alone and sys...
The US economy experienced major regulatory changes in the banking and finance industry with the pas...
As policy-makers in the United States contemplate a relaxation of financial regulation, our study co...
In this paper, we investigate whether U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs) with strong and independent...
In the aftermath of the Financial Crisis, The United States Congress passed the Dodd- Frank Wall Str...
Research Question/Issue Bank governance has become the focus of a flurry of recent research and hea...
After the consequences of the 2007 Global Financial crisis, board and committees are working harder ...
Using data for more than 200 banks from 21 OECD countries for the period 2002-2008, we examine the i...
Using data for more than 200 banks from 21 OECD countries for the period 2002-2008, we examine the i...
Regulation and corporate governance are able to influence the banks’ capital optimization problem, t...
Does a decrease in shareholder litigation enhance managers’ monitoring efforts by ensuring adequate ...
Does a decrease in shareholder litigation enhance managers’ monitoring efforts by ensuring adequate ...
We analyze bank governance, share ownership, CEO compensation, and bank risk taking in the period le...
The authors would like to thank the anonymous referee and Jim Peach of New Mexico State University f...
This paper examines the relation between securitization and bank risk of U.S. bank holding companies...
We find that shareholder-friendly corporate governance is associated with higher stand-alone and sys...
The US economy experienced major regulatory changes in the banking and finance industry with the pas...
As policy-makers in the United States contemplate a relaxation of financial regulation, our study co...
In this paper, we investigate whether U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs) with strong and independent...
In the aftermath of the Financial Crisis, The United States Congress passed the Dodd- Frank Wall Str...
Research Question/Issue Bank governance has become the focus of a flurry of recent research and hea...
After the consequences of the 2007 Global Financial crisis, board and committees are working harder ...
Using data for more than 200 banks from 21 OECD countries for the period 2002-2008, we examine the i...
Using data for more than 200 banks from 21 OECD countries for the period 2002-2008, we examine the i...
Regulation and corporate governance are able to influence the banks’ capital optimization problem, t...
Does a decrease in shareholder litigation enhance managers’ monitoring efforts by ensuring adequate ...
Does a decrease in shareholder litigation enhance managers’ monitoring efforts by ensuring adequate ...