Add to ORKGA two-person concession game with a deadline is presented. It is proved that along the Bayesian equilibrium players tend to reach an agreement at the deadline.</p
The unexplained occurrence of inefficient delays in reaching agreement is known in the economics lit...
I analyze a sequential bargaining model in which players are optimistic about their bargaining power...
We consider a dynamic model where traders in each period are matched randomly into pairs who then ba...
Abstract. Two players repeatedly try to agree on a joint decision between two alterna-tives. Costly ...
Costly delay in negotiations can induce the negotiating parties to be more forthcoming with their in...
We experimentally investigate the effect of time pressure from deadlines in a rich-context bargainin...
Under a firm deadline, agreement in bargaining is often delayed until the deadline. I propose a rati...
We describe an experiment where buyers and sellers, endowed with heterogeneous deadlines, are random...
We develop a two-person negotiation model with complete information which makes endogenous both the ...
This paper analyzes automated distributive negotiation where agents have firm deadlines that are pri...
We describe an experiment where buyers and sellers, endowed with heterogeneous deadlines, are random...
We develop a two-person negotiation model with complete information which makes endogenous both the ...
This thesis considers play in bargaining games subject to Endogenous Commitment and in contribution ...
We consider a two-player contest model in which breakthroughs arrive according to privately observed...
Delegated bargainers may deliberately adopt delay tactics, in order to be able to justify their conc...
The unexplained occurrence of inefficient delays in reaching agreement is known in the economics lit...
I analyze a sequential bargaining model in which players are optimistic about their bargaining power...
We consider a dynamic model where traders in each period are matched randomly into pairs who then ba...
Abstract. Two players repeatedly try to agree on a joint decision between two alterna-tives. Costly ...
Costly delay in negotiations can induce the negotiating parties to be more forthcoming with their in...
We experimentally investigate the effect of time pressure from deadlines in a rich-context bargainin...
Under a firm deadline, agreement in bargaining is often delayed until the deadline. I propose a rati...
We describe an experiment where buyers and sellers, endowed with heterogeneous deadlines, are random...
We develop a two-person negotiation model with complete information which makes endogenous both the ...
This paper analyzes automated distributive negotiation where agents have firm deadlines that are pri...
We describe an experiment where buyers and sellers, endowed with heterogeneous deadlines, are random...
We develop a two-person negotiation model with complete information which makes endogenous both the ...
This thesis considers play in bargaining games subject to Endogenous Commitment and in contribution ...
We consider a two-player contest model in which breakthroughs arrive according to privately observed...
Delegated bargainers may deliberately adopt delay tactics, in order to be able to justify their conc...
The unexplained occurrence of inefficient delays in reaching agreement is known in the economics lit...
I analyze a sequential bargaining model in which players are optimistic about their bargaining power...
We consider a dynamic model where traders in each period are matched randomly into pairs who then ba...