A seemingly mild assumption of the standard alternating offers bargaining model under risk is that the breakdown event is not strictly worse than the worst agreement. When this assumption is relaxed the structure of the equilibrium set of agreements changes in an interesting way. We analyse the effect of disagreement on equilibrium, and relate our result to a class of outside option models. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).</p
Experimental literature has shown that social preferences influence how individuals bargain and make...
Negotiations often occur not between individuals but among groups (companies, trade unions, politica...
In bargaining environments with uncertain impasse outcomes (e.g., litigation or labor strike outcome...
This paper develops an explanation of why bargainers often terminate negotiations in disagreement in...
We study a legislative bargaining game in which failure to agree in a given round may result in a br...
Simultaneous-offers was one of the first models proposed in non-cooperative bargaining (Nash 53, Sch...
Workers face declining pay-offs during a strike. The consequence of this is explored in a non-cooper...
International audienceWe propose a new non-cooperative approach to implement a cooperative bargainin...
The presence of obstinate types in bargaining has been shown to alter dramatically the bargaining eq...
We present a novel approach to N-person bargaining, based on the idea that the agreement reached in ...
In the economic modeling of bargaining, outside options have often been naively treated by taking th...
An alternating-offers bargaining model in which a normal-form game determines players' payoffs in di...
International audienceWe experimentally investigate, in an unstructured bargaining environment with ...
Experimental literature has shown that social preferences influence how individuals bargain and make...
Negotiations often occur not between individuals but among groups (companies, trade unions, politica...
In bargaining environments with uncertain impasse outcomes (e.g., litigation or labor strike outcome...
This paper develops an explanation of why bargainers often terminate negotiations in disagreement in...
We study a legislative bargaining game in which failure to agree in a given round may result in a br...
Simultaneous-offers was one of the first models proposed in non-cooperative bargaining (Nash 53, Sch...
Workers face declining pay-offs during a strike. The consequence of this is explored in a non-cooper...
International audienceWe propose a new non-cooperative approach to implement a cooperative bargainin...
The presence of obstinate types in bargaining has been shown to alter dramatically the bargaining eq...
We present a novel approach to N-person bargaining, based on the idea that the agreement reached in ...
In the economic modeling of bargaining, outside options have often been naively treated by taking th...
An alternating-offers bargaining model in which a normal-form game determines players' payoffs in di...
International audienceWe experimentally investigate, in an unstructured bargaining environment with ...
Experimental literature has shown that social preferences influence how individuals bargain and make...
Negotiations often occur not between individuals but among groups (companies, trade unions, politica...
In bargaining environments with uncertain impasse outcomes (e.g., litigation or labor strike outcome...
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